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Abstract 
The provision of large-scale assistance to industry is very important in China. The major contribution 
of this paper is to use Chinese firm-level panel data for 1998-2007 to introduce measures of assistance 
received by each firm directly into industry-level production functions determining firm output. Our 
results indicate inverted U-shaped gains from assistance: across the 26 industries considered, firms 
receiving assistance rates of 1-10%, 10-19%, 20-49% and 50+% experienced on average 4.5%, 9.4%, 
9.2% and -3% gains in TFP, respectively. We also provide a simple agency model that justifies such 
a result. 
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1. Introduction 
 
Providing assistance to industry as part of an industrial strategy has a long history, in both developing 
and developed economies (Schwartz and Clements, 1999). Until more recently, such approaches were 
presumed to have been largely a failure, summed-up by Cohen (2006, p. 88) as follows: 
“The standard criticism levelled against sectoral industrial policies is that the state 
has neither the necessary information nor adequate incentives to make better 
choices than the market… it tends to misestimate … the negative long-term effects 
of the protection granted to certain firms and the negative impacts of the benefits 
granted to promoted sectors on other sectors.”   
 However, industrial policy is generally now regarded more favourably as shown by various 
contributions to recent books on the topic (e.g., Felipe, 2015; Stiglitz and Lin, 2013). Rather than just 
‘believe’ in the market and allow economic success to be generated by globalisation allied to 
government intervention in support of liberalisation, privatisation and deregulation, “… it has become 
obvious that all governments are engaged in various forms of industrial policies… (therefore) the 
question is not whether any government should use industrial policy but rather how to use industrial 
policy in the best way” (Stiglitz et. al. 2013, pp. 5-6). 
 China is perceived as a country that provides large-scale assistance to industry (Haley and Haley, 
2013). But was government assistance targeted at the right firms and sectors? A recent paper by 
Aghion et. al. (2015) investigated if the distribution of government assistance to firms in China 
enhanced productivity, finding that assistance was allocated to competitive sectors and /or fostered 
competition in a sector1 so enhancing productivity growth over the 1998-2007 period. Their approach 
was essentially to test if subsidies were correlated with initial competition levels, where the latter was 
measured using a Lerner index. They also measured the concentration of assistance across firms 
within each sector (using a Herfindahl index). Both the correlations obtained at the sector-city level 
                                                
1 Competition-friendly policies are defined as those that allocate assistance to a wide group of firms in a sector (so 
encouraging competition) and/or that target younger and more productive firms. 
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(the Lerner indices) and the Herfindahl indices were regressed on firm-level total factor productivity 
(TFP) estimates obtained using an Olley-Pakes approach.  Both measures were found to have positive 
and significant impacts on TFP, and this is taken as evidence that government assistance was targeted 
at the right firms and sectors. 
 However, Aghion et. al. (op. cit.) did not test directly whether receiving assistance had a direct 
impact on each firms’ TFP; if receiving assistance is found to lower firm-level TFP (at least for some 
categories of firms or at, say, high levels of assistance) then it may well be that overall industrial 
policy in China introduces distortions that increase misallocation and work against the productivity-
enhancing effects associated with the (more macro-level) distribution of assistance. Whether 
assistance acts as a boost to investment and production, while at the same time underpinning 
productivity growth, is largely an empirical issue. Thus the major contribution of this paper is to fill 
this gap in the literature, by introducing variables that measure the assistance (e.g., tax ‘holidays’) 
received by each firm directly into production functions determining firm output. A system-GMM 
econometric approach is used to measure firm-level productivity (with the variables representing 
assistance instrumented by their lagged values).  To check the robustness of our results, the impact 
of assistance is also tested using a production function approach based on ‘matching’ firms receiving 
assistance with those not receiving ‘treatment’ who nonetheless had very similar characteristics to 
the assisted sub-group.  Both sets of results indicate that across the 26 industries considered Chinese 
firms that received assistance had higher TFP during 1998-2007, although there is some evidence that 
too high a level of assistance has negative consequences for TFP, suggesting that ‘rent-seeking’ 
and/or the pursuit of profit is blunted when firms become too dependent on government help, 
especially when such help is tied to ‘political control’ by the state (which is the case in China as 
explained below). To justify such results, we provide a simple model in the appendix that sets out 
how this is consistent with economic theory. 
 Apart from the Aghion et. al. (2015) study, we are only aware of a study by Girma et. al. (2009) 
who used the same database as we use (but only for 1999 to 2005) to consider whether subsidies 
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boosted export sales for domestic firms in manufacturing (finding subsidies stimulated exporting 
intensities of existing exporters but had little impact on encouraging firms to enter exporting). The 
major differences with the current study are: we include all (and not just domestic) firms in 
manufacturing and utilities covering 1998-2007; the more important form of assistance provided 
through ‘tax holidays’ (as well as subsidies) is included; and our dependent variable is TFP. Other 
studies, mostly covering developed economies, that consider the impact of assistance on productivity 
are relatively scarce, usually relate only to labour productivity (not TFP) and have produced mixed 
results. For example, Irwin and Klenow (1996) found no impact on labour productivity of R&D 
subsidies for U.S. high-tech companies; for Japanese forestry, Managi (2010) found a negative 
relationship between subsidies and TFP; Einio (2014) reports no instantaneous impacts of R&D 
support programmes in Finland on productivity (although there is evidence of long-term gains); 
Huang (2015) shows that tax credit use among Taiwanese firms enhanced their productivity; while 
Koski and Pajarinen (2015) report that R&D subsidies had no statistically significant impact on labour 
productivity in Finnish firms during 2003-2010, although employment subsidies and other subsidies 
(the latter covering similar State aid instruments as included in the present study) were negatively 
related to output-per-worker.2 
The paper is set out as follows. In the next section we discuss the rationale for the (Chinese) 
government providing assistance to firms, where government aid can be central, state or local (or 
some combination of all three levels). In Section 3 we discuss briefly the form that assistance takes 
and present some background information on its importance to firms. Following this, we estimate a 
Heckman model determining which firms received assistance, and for those where assistance was 
positive how much help was provided. Then the results from estimating industry-level production 
functions using system-GMM and a ‘matching’ approach are presented. The paper concludes with a 
summary and some ideas for further research that would extend the approach taken in this paper. 
 
                                                
2 Karhunen and Huovari (2015), using similar data, confirm these results for Finland. 
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2. The rationale for government assistance to firms 
The starting (traditional neoclassical) position is usually that markets are efficient such that they are 
the best mechanism by which to allocate resources (cf. the model of general equilibrium associated 
with Arrow and Debreu, 1954); the exception is when there are market failures (European 
Commission, 2002). Traditionally such failures have been associated with imperfect and asymmetric 
information being available to (especially smaller) firms, and/or imperfect (risk) markets leading to 
higher (financial) costs for by such firms and more generally a problem of incomplete markets 
(Greenwald and Stiglitz, 1986). Failures are also associated with not being able to capture positive 
externalities in other firms – such as R&D spillovers – or the wider benefits gained from geographic 
agglomeration (e.g., intra-industry specialization through Marshall-Arrow-Romer economies and/or 
inter-industry Jacobian urbanization economies3).4  
 More recently, there has been an emphasis on dynamic factors that lead to a comparative 
advantage (Rodrik, 2006), such as the importance of knowledge and firm capabilities as a source of 
firm performance and thus productivity growth.5 Thus government intervention to enhance both 
learning and learning spillovers is especially warranted to coordinate structural transformations that 
will close the “knowledge” gap that exists with firms at the (international) frontier, so moving 
resources from low- to high-productivity sectors (it is argued – see Felipe, 2015 – that such sectors 
                                                
3 See Marshall (1890), Arrow (1962), and Romer (1986) and Jacobs (1970, 1986) 
4 Such justification for government intervention on the grounds of market failure has been criticized by those who do 
not adhere to the neoclassical tradition; for example, evolutionary economists (e.g., Metcalfe and Georgiou, 1998) have 
argued that information costs, leading to asymmetric outcomes, are one of the features of the market, and they are in 
part necessary as a selection device (for promoting the fittest firms) and in providing incentives for learning and 
discovery, which is crucial to the process of variety creation upon which the evolutionary view of markets is based (as 
Metcalfe and Georgiou, op. cit., point out “a profit opportunity known to everybody is a profit opportunity for 
nobody”). This does not mean that there is no rationale for government intervention, assuming that it sees a direct 
increase in economic benefits from more firms gaining information and thus acting on that information (e.g., by 
adopting certain technologies, increasing their overall capabilities, etc.). For example, Casson (1999) argues that in this 
situation the government has a comparative advantage in information, and it is on this basis (not market failure) that it 
can justify intervention. See also Cohen (2006, section 3.1). 
5 Note, this is not limited to ‘catch-up’ in developing economies; ‘network failures’ in general arise because 
technological know-how (broadly defined) is partly tacit and therefore cannot be diffused easily. Networks can be 
important for the transfer of such tacit knowledge (they are mutual learning processes fostered by well-managed 
collaboration between specialists in complementary fields, as well as between designers, producers and end-users) , and 
they can also partly overcome the problems associated with firms experiencing bounded rationality and consequently 
bounded vision (Teece and Pisano, 1998). 
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do not develop naturally in developing economies without government help).  Thus, for example, 
Khan (2015) sets out a model of the ‘competitiveness curve’ that justifies assistance to industry 
(particularly in developing economies) based on providing ‘rents for learning’ to cover knowledge 
and capability gaps and encourage learning-by-doing. In developing economies like China, firms 
initially lack the sophisticated organisations and technical capabilities to produce goods and services 
at global quality standards (and costs), and assistance buys time to engage in the learning that is 
needed, as well as encouraging inward foreign direct investment from firms that have the required 
competencies (which should also lead to additional spillover effects). 
 In China, there is an additional rationale for government providing (large-scale) assistance to 
firms; in principle all firms in China are subject to political control – i.e., there is a lishu6 relationship, 
which means firms are “subordinate to” political influence. In practice the lishu relationship includes 
“… approvals for licences, domain, major projects, major operations decisions (such as profit 
distribution and investment) and firm structures” (Tan et. al., 2007, p. 788), all of which are set to 
meet political objectives. As well as controls, the lishu relationship also involves government support 
and subsidies (e.g., access to finance, more favourable tax treatment, granting of contracts, access to 
raw materials and other ‘scarce resources’7, etc.). The relationship is much stronger for publicly 
owned firms (e.g., state-owned enterprises, or SOEs, and collectively owned enterprises), who are 
also expected to meet certain ‘social’ goals set by politicians, such as employment targets, but it is 
still relevant to privately-owned and foreign-owned firms (either because of the strength of political 
connections and/or because of intervention by government).8 However, Xia et. al. (2009) state that 
over time the importance of lishu has diminished especially following reforms introduced in 1997, 
and the vast majority of newly established privately owned firms that have set up in China since the 
                                                
6 The Chinese name for this relationship, as represented in the National Bureau of Statistics database we use below, is 
. 
7 Closer ties to government can also help businesses to overcome market and state failures in securing property rights 
and enforcing contracts – Li et. al., (2008) and Zhou (2013). Note, therefore, this definition of politically connected 
firms is different to the approach adopted by Faccio (2006), who looked at such connections across 47 countries 
(excluding China). 
8 An essential difference in the lishu relationship between publicly-controlled and privately-owned firms tends to be that 
the former are more beset with meeting policy goals (e.g., employment) rather than receiving favourable treatment such 
as subsidies and/or access to finance (Wu et. al., 2012).   
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late 1990s have opted not to have any (formal) lishu relationship with the government (central, 
regional or local). Evidence for this is provided in Ding et. al. (2015, Table 1), who show that the 
proportion of medium- to large-sized Chinese firms in manufacturing and utilities with no political 
connections increased from 15.7% in 1998 to 76% by 2007. And yet the same data (which is also 
used in this study – see Table 1 below) shows that on average between 1998-2007 nearly 57% of 
firms receiving assistance had no formal political connections (nearly 52% of all firms, which 
includes those with no assistance, had no political connections). This provides strong support for the 
claim made by Haley and Haley (2013, Chapter 1) that under the operation of Chinese State 
Capitalism, the government is able to meet its industrial strategies not so much directly through 
traditional lishu relationships but rather through ensuring firms are dependent on government for 
financial assistance that creates mutual dependence.9 Because of the decentralisation of power in 
China to the provinces, and the further layer of often strong local government with its own agenda, 
firms can have different (even several) links with central, provincial and local governments, each 
with hidden and often conflicting budgetary processes. Li and Zhou (2005) point out that local 
government officials have a major incentive to develop the economies in their jurisdictions because 
their political careers depend on the economic performance of their regions. Thus Walder (1992, pp. 
528-29) comments that “China’s national budget is a nested hierarchy of independent budgets – each 
government unit exercises property rights over firms under their financial jurisdiction… each of 
which seeks to expand its revenues by capturing investment, subsidies, and grants”. Haley and Haley 
(op. cit. p. 21) review the case study evidence that shows “provincial governments deploy massive 
subsidies to support favoured business groups and further provincial rather than central objectives or 
efficiencies”.  
                                                
9 Haley and Haely (op. cit, p.21-22) note that “in China political factors matter at least as much as, and often more than, 
economic factors for firms’ and markets’ performance and therefore for the dispensation of subsidies”. They also argue 
– based on case studies – that there is substantial evidence that Chinese production subsidies have encouraged many 
overseas (and especially U.S.) firms to move manufacturing to China, after developing their technological competencies 
in their home countries. 
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 Thus while Chinese policymakers in the period after the ‘open door’ reforms starting in 1992 
sought to learn from how Korea and Japan achieved large-scale development, which included lessons 
in subsidising strategic industries, there is evidence (Heilmann and Shih, 2013) that full-scale 
assistance to firms (and industrial policy more generally) only really got going in the 1990’s once 
Chinese policymakers had concluded that by supporting targeted firms they could advance the state’s 
interests in the new economic order (Thun, 2004). Historically, such help had been limited to State-
owned Enterprises (SOEs), but since the 1990’s this has been extended to privately-owned firms as 
well.  
 In terms of the type of assistance usually given to firms, this tends to be based on ‘horizontal’ 
(covering activities that take place in a broad range of sectors and typically affecting the 
‘infrastructure’ surrounding firms) and ‘vertical’ (more targeted on specific firms and sectors) 
policies. The former has in more recent times received greater support as it is seen to have a smaller 
impact on competition (since it is not about ‘picking winners’ as all firms should face a ‘level playing 
field’), whereas vertical policies can favour one (sub-group) of firms to the detriment of others. That 
said, even horizontal policies impact more on certain firms (e.g., those more engaged in R&D, or 
located in sectors with attributes that are being encouraged by policy, such as higher value-added). In 
the Chinese context, Lin et. al. (2015) argue there has been a continuous upgrading towards more 
capital-intensive sectors with (latent) dynamic comparative advantage (rather than the static 
advantage of having a substantial, relatively cheap abundance of sufficiently skilled labour). In broad 
terms, industrial policy pursues the growth of ‘pillars’ (key industries10) where technology acquisition 
and improving competitive advantage feature strongly. Firms receive various financial incentives 
(including ‘tax holidays’, grants, and access to cheap loans), that are consistent with providing 
additional liquidity and sharing risk, and thus overall subsidizing production and investment; 
however, as Haley and Haley (2013, pp. 31-32) point out official information is very limited on how 
                                                
10 There are currently around 15 ‘pillar’ industries set by the central government in China, from technology-intensive 
sectors like aerospace and computing, through to wholesale and retailing. The ‘culture’ sector is also now a pillar 
industry. 
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much assistance is provided, to whom and for what. Thus they conclude that “generally, despite stated 
policies, outsiders cannot ascertain the true policies that underlie subsidies”.  
 Thus whether assistance acts as a boost to investment and production, while at the same time 
underpinning productivity growth, is largely an empirical issue. Does it mitigate market failures, help 
infant industries, new firm entry and underdeveloped capital markets, coordinate (vertical and 
horizontal) linkages in production and enhance learning-by-doing; or, as Porter (1990) argues, do 
subsidies dull the market incentives firms’ face, delay adjustment and innovativeness, and overall 
constrain flexibility and instead create a culture of ‘rent seeking’ (particularly for SOEs and those 
firms with strong political connections with government – cf. Yu et. al., 2010; Tan et. al., 2007)?  
Based on the discussion in this section, and in anticipation of the results presented below, we 
provide a simple theoretical model in the appendix where generally assistance lowers the ‘user’ cost 
of capital, so relaxing likely financial constraints and allowing firms to upgrade their capital stock 
(e.g., through lowering costs as ‘vintage’ capital stock is replaced by more efficient, newer capital 
equipment) and inducing managerial effort to introduce new and higher quality products, which in 
turn will lead to decreases in marginal cost and boost profitability. This consequently increases 
measured revenue TFP. However, a high rate of assistance also leads to more managerial effort to be 
endogenously divided into rent-seeking (e.g., through lishu relationships) rather than pursuing higher 
levels of TFP (thus higher profit), where the former (cet. par.) boosts the personal reward to managers 
rather than profitability (e.g., when corruption is present, it may be possible for them to use the extra 
profits to reward themselves more directly – see, for example, Hanke and Heine, 2015). The outcome 
is that we are able to show that up to a certain assistance rate  the effect of managerial effort 
endogenously devoted into profitability improvement (and thus TFP) dominates the effect of 
managerial effort allocated to ‘rent-seeking’; however, when actual government assistance becomes 
too high this dulls the pursuit of higher TFP as the ‘rent seeking’ effect dominates.  
Table 1 around here 
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3. The extent of government assistance to Chinese firms 
The data source used in this study covers medium- to large-sized firms belonging to 26 industries 
covering manufacturing and utilities for 1998-2007.11 Table 1 presents information on the percentages 
that received assistance during this period, with firms sub-divided into those who only received tax 
holidays, subsidies, or both types of assistance. Information on subsidies received is reported by firms 
while tax holidays is calculated from taxes paid on profits and VAT combined with data on value-
added and profits-before-tax for each firm. Firms that did not pay the full 17% rate of VAT or 33% 
profits tax are considered to have received a tax holiday.12 Table 1 also reports the average tariff (ad 
valorem equivalent) on final imported goods as an additional source of assistance to firms, computed 
using the WITS (World Bank) database.13  
 The percentage of firms receiving government assistance increased from over 53% in 1998 to 
over 72% in 2007 (Table 1). The largest form of assistance was tax holidays, while the percentage of 
firms receiving only subsidies was relatively small (and fairly constant); those receiving both tax 
holidays and subsidies rose from around 4% of firms in 1998 to over 8% by 2007. During this period, 
and reflecting China joining the WTO at the end of 2001, protection from overseas competition 
declined with the average tariff rate declining from some 18% to 10% (see Table 24.1 in Harrison, 
2014, for details on tariff rates across industries14).  
Table 2 around here 
                                                
11 A discussion of the unbalanced panel dataset used - the annual accounting reports filed by industrial firms with the 
NBS over the period of 1998-2007 – is presented in Ding et. al. (2015). This dataset includes all SOEs and other types 
of enterprises with annual sales of five million yuan (about $817,000) or more. Brandt et al. (2012.) provide a thorough 
discussion of this dataset, which for present purposes covered nearly 600 thousand firms, which corresponds to some 
2.2 million firm-year observations. 
12 The value attributed to any profits tax holiday is computed as: (0.33 ´ profits-before-tax) - profits tax paid. The value 
of any VAT holiday is (0.17 ´ value-added) - VAT paid. Du et. al. (2014), Harrison (2014) and Aghion et. al. (2015) 
provide further details. 
13 Others (e.g., Aghion et. al., 2015) have also included the ‘implied’ rate of interest firms paid on loans (calculated as 
interest payments divided by current liabilities) to measure the extent to which firms may have received loans at below-
market interest rates. Certainly the implied interest across firms did decline between 1998 and 2004 (before rising again 
between 2004 and 2007) – see Figure U.1 in the unpublished appendix. However, the percentage of firms paying zero 
interest, because they had no borrowings, also rose dramatically from around 29% in 1998 to around 42% in 2007 
(mostly due to the growth in importance of smaller privately-owned businesses during this period – see Table 1 in Ding 
et. al. (2015) – who were generally unable to secure loans from the Chinese banking system). Given this, no direct 
measure of the ‘implied’ cost of borrowing is included in this study (although, note, we do include measures on firm 
liquidity into our determinants of TFP – see Table 3 below). 
14 Table U.2 in the unpublished appendix provides the breakdown used in this study. 
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 In terms of the financial value of assistance, Table 2 presents assistance rates (calculated using 
data on the total value of assistance divided by total value-added produced for each sub-group 
shown15) broken-down into type of assistance and by ownership categories. Relief from paying VAT 
at its full rate was the most valuable source of help received (worth between 5.9 – 7.5% of value-
added during the period), followed by profit tax ‘holidays’ (increasing from around 2% in 1998 to 
nearly 5% in 2007). Direct subsidies were worth significantly less (on average around 1% of value-
added over 1998-2007). Cumulatively, assistance rose from around 10% of value-added in 1998 to 
13% by 2007; foreign-owned firms (including those based in special economic areas and Taiwan) 
received the highest rates of assistance, rising slowly over time, while (perhaps unexpectedly) SOEs 
as a sub-group received the lowest rates of assistance.16 
Table 3 around here 
4. The distribution of assistance across firms 
In this section we report the results on estimating a Heckman model determining which firms received 
assistance and, for those who received help, their assistance rate. Table 3 firstly presents information 
on the mean values of the variables used in the Heckman model. Most of these variables are the same 
as those used in Ding et. al. (2015) when estimating TFP; further details on the variables and a 
justification for their use in this current study are available from this earlier paper. The additional 
variables used here comprise whether firms were assisted or not, the rate of assistance, a measure of 
new firm entry by industry/province/year and the imported final goods tariff rate. The latter two 
variables are included to assess if firms were more likely to be assisted if they were in industries and 
provinces with relatively higher entry rates (denoting lower barriers and/or greater competition), and 
if ‘protected’ domestic markets were more or less likely to have higher assistance. 
                                                
15 That is, not the average across firms – totals for each sub-group were instead used. 
16 Table U.3 in the unpublished appendix provides a breakdown of assistance rates across ownership sub-groups by type 
of assistance. It is also important to note that while SOEs had lower rates of assistance, the NBS data shows that in 1998 
SOEs received nearly 39% of all assistance by value (¥64.6 of a total of ¥167.4 billion); in 2007 they received just over 
14% of all assistance (¥207.9 of a total of ¥1,453.2 billion).  
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 For all of the variables listed in Table 3 there is a significant difference between the mean 
values for assisted and non-assisted firms (in all cases significant at the 1% level based on a two-
sided t-test). Thus assisted firms are larger and younger; more (less) likely to have no (high) political 
affiliations;  more (less) likely to be foreign-owned (SOEs, collectively-owned); more likely to be 
exporters, undertake R&D, and operate in less competitive industries; less likely to operate in 
diversified city areas but more likely to be located in areas with higher industry agglomerations and 
in major cities; have lower fixed costs and higher liquidity (suggesting that the authorities were risk-
adverse in their approach to selection); belong to industries and provinces with higher firm entry; face 
lower import tariffs; and are more likely to be located in Western China and the East Coast  and less 
likely in Central China.  
 The Heckman model estimated is: 
!""#"$%&'( = *+ + *-	!""#"$%&'(/- + *0 1#2ℎ	456#$#786	899#6#8$#5:	×	<=> '(	+ 
                                                       *?@'( + A'(																																																																								(1) ln(8""#"$8:7%	E8$%)'( = G+ + G- ln(8""#"$8:7%	E8$%)'(/- + 
 G0(1#2ℎ	456#$#786	899#6#8$#5:	×	<=>)'( 	+ G?H'( + I	JKL'( + M'(                          (2) 
 
where @'( and H'(are sets of control variables determining the probability of being assisted and the 
intensity of assistance; and IMR is the inverse of the Mills’ ratio (hence I = NO, where O measures 
corr(A'(M'() while N measures the standard deviation of M'(). A wide range of control variables (see 
Table 3, plus additionally year and industry dummies) initially comprising P'( ∈ H'(⋃	@'(were 
allowed to enter equations (1) and (2), with the model being identified by the non-linearity of the 
probit equation; a stepwise approach was then used to impose exclusion restrictions on the two parts 
of the model so that there were (statistically significant) variables in H'(, 	@'( such that H'( ⊄ 	@'( and 
vice versa. Note, equations (1) and (2) also included an additional composite variable comprising 
whether the firm had high-level political connections with central or provincial governments and was 
also an SOE; the expectation being that such firms would have an even greater likelihood of being in 
receipt of government assistance. 
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Table 4 around here 
 Table 4 presents the results from estimating equations (1) and (2) using the Heckman 
procedure in STATA. With regard to the selection equation determining which firms received 
assistance, marginal effects (U4	/UW)	are reported indicating that firms assisted in t - 1 were some 
89% more likely to be assisted in period t, suggesting that a large degree of persistence in who was 
granted assistance. Larger firms were also more likely to receive government help, and the probability 
of being assisted increased over time. Older firms were (cet. par.) less likely to receive help, while 
those with either no or high political connections (vis-à-vis the benchmark group with connections to 
local government) had around a 2-2.5% less likelihood of being assisted. SOEs also had a 4.2% lower 
probability of being assisted. Because the marginal effects are calculated taking account of any 
interactions between variables, these results based on political connections and SOE status do not 
show separately the underlying effect for firms with high-level political connections with central or 
provincial governments and being an SOE;17 the underlying estimate of *0in equation (1) is reported 
in the footnote to the table, indicating that while strong political connections and being an SOE are 
negatively related to receiving assistance, the joint-effect of being both was strongly positive towards 
receiving assistance. 
 Foreign-owned firms (covering all those owned by companies outside mainland China) had 
higher likelihoods of being assisted, as were exporters (3.3% more likely) and those undertaking 
R&D (1.6% more likely). Operating in less competitive industries and being located in more 
diversified areas increased the probability of assistance, while areas with higher levels of 
agglomeration experienced lower chances of being assisted. Higher fixed costs and/or negative 
liquidly acted against being assisted, while those firms belong to industries/provinces with higher 
firm entry benefited from being more likely to receive assistance. Firms belonging to industries with 
higher tariff rates received a lower likelihood of assistance, while being located in the north east area 
                                                
17 Note, where there is an interaction term only one overall marginal effect is calculated since the marginal effects 
command in STATA ‘solves out’ the overall impact of each variable (UW-) on the probability of being assisted (U4) – 
i.e., if all three terms W-, W0, W-×	W0	enter the model, then changing the interaction term W-×	W0 cannot impact on 4 
independently of changing W-, W0	so it is not really feasible to try to explain the impact of W-×	W0 in isolation of W-, W0. 
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of China (Liaoning, Jilin or Heilongjiang provinces) increased the probability of being assisted (vis-
à-vis other areas18). Being located in a major city also reduced the chance of being assisted (cet. par. 
by some 5.5%), while there were large differences across industries (10% more likely in agricultural 
and food processing versus between 22-30 less likely to receive assistance if the firm belonged to the 
tobacco, petroleum processing and petroleum and gas extraction sectors). 
 As to whether firms received higher rates of assistance (when assistance > 0), Table 4 shows 
that (cet. par.) firms with a 10% higher assistance rate in t - 1 had a 4.7% higher rate of assistance in 
period t; again this confirms that there was significant continuity with regard to who was assisted and 
by how much. The results for other variables are also similar (in terms of their direction) to those 
obtained from the selection equation. The major exceptions are that larger firms and those 
undertaking R&D received (cet. par.) less assistance; while SOEs achieved higher assistance rates, 
especially if they also had strong political connections (the latter sub-group attained a 4.2% higher 
rate of assistance19). In certain industry sectors the signs attached to the *?, G?are either of opposite 
sign (e.g. food production) or more commonly statistically zero for one of the parameter estimates 
(e.g., textiles). Overall, O	- measuring the correlation between (A'(M'(), and thus the extent to which 
there is a selection problem – is significant and positive, showing that the unobservable factors that 
determine whether a firm is assisted are correlated with unobservable factors that positively determine 
the rate of assistance received.20 
 Overall, the results obtained suggest that the distribution of assistance across firms is likely 
to have both positive and negative effects on competitiveness (and productivity). Firstly, the high 
degree of persistence in who gets assistance (and assistance rates) suggests that rent-seeking activity 
may have been prevalent, especially as larger firms operating in high concentration industries and 
with greater liquidity especially benefited, particularly if they were SOEs with strong political 
                                                
18 Note, after the north east area, firms located in the east coast were next in terms of having a higher probability of 
receiving assistance (and receiving higher assistance rates). 
19 I.e., % /+.+-YZ+.+-[Z+.+\\ − 1 
20 Based on IJKL'(, which equals 0.101, this shows by how much conditional assistance rates are shifted up due to the 
selection effect; a firm with average characteristics which is selected into receiving assistance obtains a 100´[%+.-+- −1] = 10.6% higher assistance rate than a firm (with average characteristics) drawn at random from the population.  
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connections. However, our results also show that factors likely to be associated with positive links to 
competitiveness were also present: younger firms, exporters, those that were foreign-owned (with 
presumed technological advantages), those undertaking R&D, and those operating in sectors with 
high new firm entry rates and lower tariffs, were likely to be targeted for government help.21 Thus, in 
the next section the direct impact of receiving assistance on TFP is estimated using firm-level 
production functions. 
 
5. The direct impact of assistance on firms’ productivity 
In this section we present some empirical findings on the relationship between the rate of government 
assistance received and TFP. The methodology (and justification for its use22) has been fully set out 
in in Ding et. al. (2015), where a system Generalised Methods of Moments (GMM) approach was 
used to estimate log-linear Cobb-Douglas gross-output production functions for 26 industries in 
China, using annual firm-level National Bureau of Statistics (NBS) data for 1998-2007. Specifically, 
we estimate the following model: 
                          `'( = *' + *a%'( + *bc'( + *de'( + *fH'( + *g$ + h'(                                     (3) 
where endogenous `, %, c and e refer respectively to the logarithms of real gross output, 
employment, intermediate inputs, and the capital stock in firm # at time $ (# = 1,… ,j; 	$ = 1,…l); 
and H'( is a vector of observed (proxy) variables determining TFP. In particular we include dummy 
variables measuring the rate of assistance received (compared to the benchmark sub-group who 
received no assistance); also included into the vector H'(are firm characteristics such as firm age, 
political affiliation, firm ownership, export behavior, whether the firm engaged in R&D, financial 
                                                
21 There is also some tentative evidence that industries with higher levels of technology and value-added benefited vis-
à-vis other sectors. The main beneficiaries (cet. par.) were: agriculture, timber, basic chemicals, standard machinery, 
ICT, electrical machinery & equipment, measuring instruments, and gas production; the main ‘losers’ were: beverages, 
tobacco, paper making, printing, petroleum processing, rubber, metal products, electric power, water production, coal 
mining, and petroleum & natural gas extraction. 
22 Such as the need to use a fixed-effects estimator; the strengths of the approach versus the Olley and Pakes (1996) and 
Levinsohn and Petrin (2003) approaches; the need to estimate a gross-output versus value-added production function; 
and the consistency of estimating TFP using a single-stage (rather than multi-stage) approach. 
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variables, and geographic location (Table 3 above provides a list of most all of the variables used, 
with other set out in Table 1 in Ding et. al., op. cit.). Lastly, $ is a time trend, measuring exogenous 
gains in TFP over time.  
Equation (3) – in dynamic form with additional lagged values of output and factor inputs – is 
estimated using the two-step XTABOND2 system GMM approach (Arellano and Bond, 1991) 
implemented in STATA (this also involves correcting for any potential finite sample bias using 
Windmeijer’s, 2005, approach). Thus equation (3) is estimated both in first-differences and in levels, 
allowing for fixed effects and tackling endogeneity of the right-hand-side variables (including the 
lagged dependent variable) and selection bias by using lagged values of the endogenous variables as 
instruments in the first differences equation, and first-differences of the same variables as instruments 
in the levels equation (Blundell and Bond, 1998)23. In this study, gross output, intermediate inputs, 
labour, and capital are treated as endogenous, as well as assistance rates, political affiliation, capital 
ownership, exporting, and R&D. Lastly, according to Arellano and Bond (1991), the presence of 
second-order autocorrelation implies that the estimates are inconsistent. Panel tests for 
autocorrelation are used to establish whether second-order correlation is an issue.  
Table 5 around here 
The detailed results from estimating equation (3) for 26 two-digit industries/industry groups 
are presented in Table U.1 (in the unpublished appendix). These are very similar to those presented 
in Ding et. al. (2015), to which the interested reader is directed for a full discussion. Here we 
concentrate on the parameter estimates for the assistance variables (Table 5, top half). Firstly, as the 
diagnostics show, the models estimated pass various tests of the validity of the instruments used and 
tests for autocorrelation. All the models for the 26 industries pass the Hansen test for over-
identification at the 10% level or better, suggesting the validity of the instrument set used. With regard 
                                                
23 We use Roodman’s (2009) ‘collapse’ procedure in all our estimations using XTABOND2 in STATA, such that only 
the instruments applicable to each variable – not the full instrument set covering all variables – are used. Too many 
instruments have been shown to often result in a Hansen p-value at or very close to 1. 
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to tests for autocorrelation, none show evidence of second-order serial correlation in the differenced 
residuals (based on a 10% significance level), suggesting the overall consistency of our estimates.  
Table 5 shows that in 11 out of 26 industries the impact of assistance on TFP increases 
monotonically for those firms that receive less than 10%, 10-19% and 20-49% assistant rates; for a 
further 10 industries assistance rates between 1-9% have a significantly positive effect while the 
impact is greater for those in receipt of 10-19% assistance rates, and approximately the same for those 
receiving 20-49% compared to 10-19% assistance. Only for the petroleum sector, measuring 
instruments, electronic power generation and gas production is there a decline in the positive impact 
of assistance on TFP for the 20-49% sub-group compared to 10-19%. Tobacco is the only sector 
where assistance (for any sub-group) has no statistically significant impact on TFP. In 9 industries 
firms with assistance rates 50+% experienced significant declines in TFP (especially coal mining, 
electronic power generation and water production), while in nonmetal products receiving 50+% 
assistance boosted TFP by 5.7% and in metal products the impact was 13.7% higher TFP (only in the 
latter sector does TFP increases monotonically across all assistance rate sub-groups).   
On average across all 26 industries, the parameter estimates in Table 5 show that firms 
receiving assistance rates of 1-10%, 10-19%, 20-49% and 50+% experienced on average 4.5%, 9.4%, 
9.2% and -3% gains in TFP, respectively.24 This complements the result obtained by Aghion et. al. 
(2015) that “… driving the Herfindahl for the dispersion of tax holidays on income taxes and value-
added taxes to 0 would lead to an increase in TFP of 8.5 to 10.3 percentage points” (pp. 15-16). Thus 
both studies show that assistance to industry in China has a direct and an indirect impact on firm-
level TFP. 
Lastly, as a check on our results, we also re-estimated equation (3) using a ‘matched’ sample 
approach (Imbens and Rubin, 2015). Separately for each of the 26 industries covered here we used a 
propensity-score approach based on estimating equation (1) to predict the likelihood of receiving 
assistance and then used one-to-one ‘matching’ to create an overlapping ‘treatment’ and ‘control’ 
                                                
24 This is based on taking a simple average across all industries (irrespective of whether parameter estimates were 
statistically significant or not) and expressing the results as % m − 1. 
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group of firms (the STATA procedure PSMATCH2 was used). This smaller sample was then used to 
re-estimate equation (3) – using system-GMM but this time not instrumenting assistance rates – with 
the key results reported in Table 5 (lower half). Tests of the appropriateness of the ‘matching’ 
technique (using PSTEST in STATA) based on Rubin’s B and R show that the ‘treatment’ and 
‘control’ groups are sufficiently balanced. Moreover, the results obtained with respect to the 
parameter estimates attached to the assistance rate dummies are generally similar; the averages across 
all industries of the impact of assistance on TFP for the various sub-groups are less than 10 percentage 
points different when the ‘full’ data and ‘matched’ data results are compared. This confirms that the 
estimates produced in Table 5 (top half) of the impact of assistance on TFP are indeed robust. 
 
6. Summary and conclusions 
Industrial policy, particularly through the provision of large-scale assistance to industry in the form 
of ‘tax holidays’ and subsidies to firms, is very important in China (e.g., the data used here for 
medium- to large-sized firms in manufacturing and utilities shows that in 2007 over 72% of firms 
received government assistance, worth around 13% of their value-added). Recently Aghion et. al. 
(2015) have reported that the distribution of government assistance to firms in China has enhanced 
productivity over the 1998-2007 period, given that it was allocated to competitive sectors and /or 
fostered competition in a sector. However, they did not test directly whether receiving assistance had 
a direct impact on each firms’ TFP, perhaps thereby introducing distortions that work against the 
productivity-enhancing effects associated with the distribution of assistance.  
  The major contribution of this paper has been to use Chinese firm-level panel data for 1998-
2007 to both model (using the Heckman approach) which firms received assistance (and if so, the 
rate of assistance provided) and then to introduce measures of assistance received by each firm 
directly into industry-level production functions determining firm output. The latter were estimated 
using a system-GMM econometric approach with assistance instrumented by its lagged valued); and 
by estimating production functions using ‘matched’ data comprising firms receiving assistance and 
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firms not receiving ‘treatment’ who nonetheless had very similar characteristics to the assisted sub-
group.   
  In terms of our results regarding who gets assistance (and assistance rates), they suggest that 
the distribution of assistance across firms is likely to have both positive and negative effects on 
competitiveness (and productivity). There was high degree of persistence across time in terms of 
which firms benefited, suggesting that rent-seeking activity may have been prevalent, especially as 
larger firms operating in high concentration industries and with greater liquidity were favoured, 
particularly if they were SOEs with strong political connections. However, our results also showed 
that factors likely to be associated with positive links to competitiveness were also present: younger 
firms, those that were foreign-owned (with presumed technological advantages), exporters and those 
operating in sectors with high new firm entry rates and lower tariffs, were likely to be targeted for 
government help 
  With regard to estimating industry production functions (using both system-GMM and 
‘matching’ approaches) the results indicated that, across the 26 industries considered, Chinese firms 
that received assistance had higher TFP during 1998-2007, although there is some evidence that too 
high a level of assistance has negative consequences for TFP. On average the results showed that 
firms receiving assistance rates of 1-10%, 10-19%, 20-49% and 50+% experienced on average 4.5%, 
9.4%, 9.2% and -3% gains in TFP, respectively. 
  Turning to further work that could be done, we have not at this stage set out to test if different 
forms of assistance (i.e., different types of tax holidays as well as subsidies to firms) have differential 
impacts. Our initial attempts to do this using system-GMM appeared to suffer from collinearity 
problems, so further experimentation with regard to modelling is necessary. It would also be useful 
to consider the extent to which productivity growth differed across various sub-groups of firms (e.g., 
by ownership) separately for ‘assisted’ and noon-assisted’ firms, while at the same time decomposing 
such growth into ‘within’ firm contributions and the contributions of the entry and exit of firms. A 
Haltiwanger (1997) type of approach would suit this type of work. Taking this a stage further, it 
 19 
would also be interesting to model directly the impact of assistance on the (hazard rate of) firm 
closure. 
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Appendix 
We provide a simple agency model to show that government subsidies generally provide an incentive 
to pursue higher TFP, but over-assistance may induce the manager to substitute managerial effort by 
rent-seeking effort, which consequently lowers TFP.  
        Consider a firm controlled by a manager who can exert two kinds of managerial effort: profit-
seeking effort and rent-seeking effort. The first increases product quality as perceived by the 
consumer and hence increases the market demand of the product and finally the profitability of the 
firm; while rent-seeking effort allows the manager to engage in personal reward to directly benefit 
herself. The total effort of the manager is finite so she faces a trade-off between the two kinds of 
effort. 
        For simplicity, the firm employs a Cobb-Douglas function: 
 n = %o>mpKmq	rms (A.1) 
where Y, E, M and K refer to output, employment, intermediate inputs and capital stock;  ω is the 
physical productivity of the firm, and we assume constant return to scale so *a + *b + *a= 1. With 
imperfect competition, demand is: 
 n = tu%v(?) (A.2) 
and we assume the elasticity of demand is η < −1; P is the price of the product; and f(x) is the quality 
of the product which is a function of the managerial profit-seeking effort x. We assume f(x) is 
increasing in x. Factor prices are PE, PM, and PK(γ), and in particular the ‘user’ cost of capital PK(γ) 
is a function of government assistance γ (with wxswy < 0). 
        Given managerial effort and subsidies, the firm chooses labor, material, and capital to maximise 
profit, subjective to the production function (A.1) and the demand curve (A.2): 
 |v W, } = maxa,b,d tn − ta> −tbK − td(})r    (A.3) 
        After some manipulation, the profit function can be shown to be: 
 |v W, } = Φ[td(})](-Zu)md%/o -Zu Zv(?) (A.4) 
where Φ = (− -u)( uuZ-)uZ-[tamptbmq -mpÉpmpÉqmsÉs]uZ-, which does not involve x or γ.  
        As well as managerial effort to boost product quality, managers can also exert rent-seeking effort 
q: 
     |Ñ Ö, } = }2(Ö)     (A.5) 
where g(q), the share of government assistance that directly rewards management, is increasing in 
rent-seeking effort q. Assuming that the nominal salary of managers is a share β of firm profit, we 
can write the problem of the manager as: 
     max?,Ü G|v W, } + |Ñ Ö, }     (A.6) 
subject to the constraint that total effort (x + q) = 1. This imposes a trade-off for the manager of 
allocating her effort between pursuing TFP (hence higher profit) and pursuing rent-seeking to boost 
her private rewards without having to make the effort of boosting TFP. 
        To simplify the solution of the problem (and without loss of generality), we set f(x) = x and g(q) 
= %Ü/-, and td } = %/ytd where td = 1 is the normalised market ‘user’ cost of capital. Thus, the 
first order condition of the manager’s problem is  
                                     βΦ[td } ] -Zu md%/o -Zu Z? − 	}%/? = 0    (A.7) 
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where the first term measures the marginal return to managerial effort from firm profit that determines 
nominal salary, while the second term represents the marginal return of managerial effort from rent-
seeking. The former is positive while the latter is negative (as she has less rent-seeking effort to spend 
the more profit-seeking effort is allocated). The trade-off between the two implies optimal managerial 
effort is:25 
   W∗ } = -0 [ â + 1 ä − 6:GΦ + 6:} + *d 1 + â }]  (A.8) 
          Note that W∗ }  is a concave function of }, with a maximum at }∗ = 	 /-ms -Zu .26 Also, measured 
TFP is: 
   lãt(}) = /-u [W∗ } − ä 1 + â ] 		= /-0 [ â + 1 ä − 6:GΦ + 6:} + *d 1 + â }]       (A.9) 
          As â < −1, measured TFP is higher if physical productivity ä is higher. More importantly, 
assistance generally increase TFP except when assistance is too high.  This is summarized in the 
following proposition. 
Proposition 1: When } < }∗, W∗ }  and lãt(}) are increasing in }; when } ≥ }∗, W∗ }  and lãt(}) are decreasing in }. 
        That is, government subsidies lower the marginal cost of production and provide an incentive to 
the manager to allocate more effort to pursue higher profitability (via higher TFP), but over-assistance 
induces the manager to substitute managerial effort by rent-seeking effort, and consequently lowers 
TFP. 
                                                
25 Note that we can shift the location of productivity ω to make sure the optimal choice is between 0 and 1, without loss 
of generality.  
26 Note that â < −1, so }∗ > 0. We assume *d > /--Zu , so }∗ < 1. Thus, the optimal effort is an interior solution. 
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Table 1: Percentage of firmsa receiving tax holidaysb, subsidies or both, China 1998-2007 
 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 
No assistance given 47.3 40.6 33.9 34.3 32.9 32.6 32.8 30.1 29.5 27.6 
Only	tax	holidays	 43.8	 50.3	 55.8	 55.2	 55.2	 57.6	 53.2	 56.8	 57.8	 60.2	
Only	subsides	given	 5.1	 7.3	 4.4	 4.5	 4.8	 3.7	 5.2	 4.9	 4.4	 3.9	
Both	tax	holiday	and	subsidies	 3.8	 1.8	 6.0	 6.0	 7.0	 6.0	 8.8	 8.1	 8.2	 8.3	
Average tariff (AVE) on imports	 18.42	 17.72	 17.47	 16.35	 12.97	 11.47	 10.37	 9.70	 9.66	 10.04	
a Covers manufacturing, mining and utilities.           Source: NBS data and WITS (World Bank) 
b Reduced VAT rate and/or reduced profit tax rate 
 
Table 2: Value of assistance to industry as a percentage of total value-added produced, China 1998-2007  
 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 
All firmsa           
Value-added not taxed at 17% rate 6.1 6.9 5.9 6.7 6.5 6.5 7.4 7.3 7.5 7.5 
Profits not taxed at 33% 2.2 1.1 4.4 3.8 3.8 4.2 4.4 4.3 4.5 4.8 
Subsidised income 1.5 0.9 1.3 1.1 1.2 0.9 1.1 1.1 1.0 0.7 
Total assistanceb          
All firms 9.8 8.8 11.6 11.6 11.5 11.6 12.9 12.7 12.9 13.0 
Foreign-owned 13.4 9.8 15.3 15.1 16.6 16.9 17.8 17.1 17.1 17.4 
SOE's 8.6 8.6 10.4 10.7 8.2 8.0 8.7 9.2 10.4 10.4 
HK/Macao/Taiwan-owned 14.0 9.5 15.6 16.1 16.6 16.3 17.8 16.8 15.6 16.1 
Owned by collectives 10.4 8.3 11.5 11.6 12.1 12.1 13.5 12.8 12.7 12.5 
Owned by private companies 9.0 9.1 11.2 10.8 11.6 11.6 12.8 12.4 12.5 12.6 
a Covers manufacturing, mining and utilities.                 Source: NBS data  
b Each firm was assigned to the ownership sub-group which had 50+% of its share capital. When no sub-group had 50+% then the sub-group with the largest 
percentage share was used.                  
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Table 3: Descriptive statistics for variables used in determining assistance to firms, China 1998-2007 
  Assistance > 0 All firms 
Variable Description ! s ! s 
ln assistance rate ln (100 ´ value of all assistance ÷ value added) 2.600 0.67 - - 
Assisted Dummy variable = 1 if firm received assistance - - 0.592 0.49 
ln employment ln numbers employed in firm 4.803 1.17 4.769 1.18 
ln firm age ln firm age (based on year-of-birth) 2.130 0.89 2.220 0.91 
No political affiliation No political connections 0.568 0.50 0.516 0.50 
High political 
affiliation 
Political connections with central or provincial 
governments 0.050 0.22 0.063 0.24 
Foreign-owned 
 
Dummy variable = 1 if proportion of capital owned that 
is foreign-owned >=0.5a 0.085 0.28 0.065 0.25 
SOE 
 
Dummy variable = 1 if proportion of capital owned by 
state >=0.5 a 0.100 0.30 0.146 0.35 
HK/Macau/Taiwan-
owned 
Dummy variable = 1 if proportion of capital owned that 
is HK/Macau/Taiwan-owned >=0.5 a 0.089 0.29 0.069 0.25 
Collective-owned 
 
Dummy variable = 1 if proportion of capital owned by 
collectives >=0.5 a 0.113 0.32 0.125 0.33 
Exporter A dummy variable for firms that export 0.287 0.45 0.251 0.43 
R&D dummy 
 
Dummy variable = 1 if firm undertook any spending on 
R&D  0.117 0.32 0.109 0.31 
ln Agglomeration 
 
ln % of industry output (2-digit SIC) located in each 
province in which firm is located – MAR-spillovers 1.758 1.16 1.730 1.17 
ln Herfindahl 
 
ln Herfindahl index of industrial concentration (by 2-
digit SIC) -6.368 0.98 -6.325 1.01 
ln Diversification 
 
 
ln proportion of 3-digit industries (maximum 226) 
located in (208) city areas in which firm is located – 
Jacobian spillovers -0.654 0.36 -0.650 0.38 
ln Fixed costs ln selling & distribution costs as % of sales 1.073 0.86 1.084 0.90 
ln liquidity 
 
Dummy variable = 1 if ratio of (current assets - current 
liabilities) to total assets £ 0 0.134 0.16 0.122 0.15 
Neg_liquid 
 
ln [1 +ratio of (current assets - current liabilities) to total 
assets] 0.386 0.49 0.426 0.49 
Proportion new firms 
 
No. new firms ÷ no. existing firm for each 2-digit 
industry SIC/province/year 0.024 0.03 0.022 0.03 
Tariff rate (fob final 
goods) 
Percentage rate of ad valorem tariff (fob final goods) for 
44 industries (source: WITS, Worldbank) 12.232 6.94 12.488 7.48 
Western China 
 
 
Dummy = 1 for firm located in Xinjing, Tibet, Gansu, 
Qinghai, Sichuan, Chongqing, Yunnan, Guizhou, 
Guangxi, Inner Mongolia 0.655 0.48 0.650 0.48 
East Coast 
 
 
Dummy = 1 for firm located in Guangdong, Fujian, 
Zhejiang, Jiangsu, Shandong, Hainan, Hebrei, Beijing, 
Tianjin, Shanghai 0.168 0.37 0.164 0.37 
Central China 
 
Dummy = 1 for firm located in Hunan, Jiangxi, Hubei, 
Anhui, Henan, Shanxi 0.113 0.32 0.119 0.32 
City 200 
 
Dummy = 1 for firm located in top 200 cities based on 
population size 0.817 0.39 0.780 0.41 
N (thousands)  1,293 2,184 
a For firms with <50% share ownership in a particularly category, they were assigned to the largest ownership 
sub-group                                  Source: NBS data 
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Table 4: Heckman model of assistance provided to Chinese firms, 1998-2007 
Dependent	variable:	 ln	assistance	rate	 Assisted	(0/1)	
	 "	 z-value	 #$#%	 z-value 
ln	assistance	ratet-1	 0.468	 446.77	 -	 - 
Assistedt-1   0.891	 400.92	
ln	employment	 -0.015	 -21.05	 0.008	 21.40	
1999	 -0.023	 -6.59	 -0.071	 -23.92	
2000	 0.014	 2.81	 -0.100	 -32.57	
2002	 0.013	 3.86	 -0.026	 -12.34	
2003	 0.006	 1.73	 -0.014	 -6.69	
2004	 0.044	 12.17	 -0.021	 -9.59	
2005	 -0.005	 -1.37	 -0.013	 -6.38	
2006	 0.003	 0.89	 0.008	 4.24	
2007	 0.013	 3.89	 0.031	 16.34	
ln	firm	age	 -0.009	 -7.49	 -0.025	 -44.57	
No	political	affiliation	 -0.009	 -4.64	 -0.020	 -18.98	
High	political	affiliationa	 -0.019	 -4.00	 -0.025	 -9.77	
Foreign-owned	 0.078	 25.88	 0.062	 43.34	
SOEa	 0.016	 4.27	 -0.042	 -22.46	
HK/Macau/Taiwan-owned	 0.054	 18.86	 0.053	 37.29	
Collective-owned	 0.031	 12.33	 0.004	 3.12	
High	affiliation	x	SOEa	 0.044	 6.16	 n.a.	  
Exporter	 0.035	 17.38	 0.033	 32.12	
R&D	dummy	 -0.034	 -15.66	 0.016	 13.07	
ln	Agglomeration	 -0.020	 -22.95	 -0.009	 -18.33	
ln	Herfindahl	 0.006	 3.76	 0.064	 109.51	
ln	Diversification	 0.025	 6.41	 0.075	 47.77	
ln	Fixed	costs	 -0.017	 -17.69	 -0.017	 -35.89	
ln	liquidity	 0.130	 22.55	 0.019	 5.41	
Neg_liquid	 -0.001	 -0.38	 -0.042	 -36.72	
Proportion	new	firms	 0.102	 3.54	 0.163	 8.92	
Tariff	rate	(fob	final	goods)	 -0.001	 -6.06	 -0.001	 -9.38	
Western	China	 -0.040	 -10.79	 -0.075	 -40.74	
East	Coast	 -0.019	 -5.80	 -0.027	 -14.15	
Central	China	 -0.034	 -9.16	 -0.038	 -18.13	
City	200	 -0.021	 -7.11	 -0.055	 -48.29	
Industry	 	 	 	 	
Agricultural	and	food	processing		 0.135	 32.43	 0.101	 48.98	
Food	production		 0.026	 5.12 -0.022	 -6.92	
Beverage		 -	 -	 -0.078	 -17.39	
Tobacco		 -0.244	 -8.75	 -0.242	 -17.62	
Textiles		 -	 -	 0.003	 1.60	
Timber		 0.040	 7.93	 -0.010	 -3.18	
Papermaking		 -0.039	 -8.01	 -0.071	 -27.99	
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Printing		 -0.059	 -9.28	 -0.066	 -20.42 
Cultural		 0.036	 5.64	 -	 -	
Petroleum	processing		 -0.056	 -5.15	 -0.222	 -43.27 
Basic	chemicals		 0.014	 4.68	 -	 -	
Medical	instruments		 -0.037	 -6.84 -	 -	
Rubber		 -	 - -0.114	 -28.71	
Metal	products		 -0.021	 -5.34 -0.092	 -52.23	
Standard	machinery		 -	 -	 0.029	 19.89	
Transport	equipment		 -	 -	 -0.129	 -55.37 
ICT,	electrical	machinery	&	equipment		 0.028	 9.96	 -	 -	
Measuring	instruments		 0.051	 8.82	 -	 -	
Other	manufacturing		 -	 - -0.018	 -7.11	
Electric	power		 -0.103	 -11.52	 -0.242	 -74.99	
Gas	production		 0.202	 12.47	 -	 -	
Water	production		 -	 -	 -0.193	 -42.35	
Coal	mining		 -0.048	 -5.94 -0.189	 -54.48	
Petroleum	&	Natural	Gas	extraction		 -	 -	 -0.297	 -16.78	
l	 0.084	 4.49	 	 	
r	 0.147	 4.49	 	 	
	 	 	 	 	
N		 599,982	 1,303,974	
	a	The	underlying	parameter	estimates	for	the	selection	equation	with	regard	to	‘High	political	affiliation’,	‘SOE’	and	‘High	affiliation	
x	SOE’	were	-0.113	(-11.46),	-0.158	(-24.21)	and	0.206	(14.71),	respectively	(z-values	in	parenthesis).		
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Table 5: Long-run impact on TFP of assistance to firms (26 industries, China, 1998-2007) 
Dependent	variable:	ln	sales	
		
Other	Mining	 Food	production	 Tobacco	 Textile	 Apparel	&footwear	 Leather	 Timber	 Furniture	 Paper-making	
(SIC10+80)	 (SIC14)		 (SIC16)		 (SIC17)		 	(SIC18)		 (SIC19)			 (SIC20)			 	(SIC21)		 (SIC22)			
Results	for	assistance	variables	based	on	‘full’	data	sample	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	
Assistance	rate	<10%	 0.027***	 0.064***	 0.022	 0.024***	 0.034***	 0.019***	 0.057***	 0.042***	 0.035***	
	 4.40	 7.48	 0.57	 5.57	 3.86	 4.60	 5.99	 5.53	 10.54	
Assistance	rate	10-<20%	 0.069***	 0.091***	 0.013	 0.083***	 0.081***	 0.035***	 0.094***	 0.080***	 0.066***	
	 11.07	 7.93	 0.25	 7.73	 4.10	 4.39	 8.75	 9.87	 16.23	
Assistance	rate	20-<50%	 0.080***	 0.087***	 0.067	 0.101***	 0.079***	 0.035***	 0.113***	 0.092***	 0.060***	
	 7.24	 4.67	 0.84	 6.19	 2.96	 2.57	 5.54	 8.59	 9.52	
Assistance	rate	50+%	 -0.011	 0.028	 -0.109	 0.001	 -0.062*	 -0.013	 -0.017	 0.002	 -0.043***	
	 -0.45	 0.88	 -1.00	 0.06	 -1.84	 -0.81	 -0.47	 0.09	 -2.98	
Observations	 22,089	 23,186	 2,244	 112,526	 65,023	 24,872	 38,762	 22,091	 30,420	
Number	of	firms	 9,426	 8,850	 483	 35,007	 20,534	 9,209	 12,942	 6,960	 10,230	
AR(2)	z-statistic	p-value	 0.731	 0.155	 0.785	 0.293	 0.921	 0.223	 0.131	 0.288	 0.735	
Hansen	test	p-value	 0.122	 0.127	 0.538	 0.163	 0.250	 0.396	 0.667	 0.158	 0.223	
	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	
Results	for	assistance	variables	based	on	'matched’	data	samplea	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	
Assistance	rate	<10%	 0.031***	 0.053***	 0.048	 0.019***	 0.040***	 0.023***	 0.060***	 0.037***	 0.035***	
	 4.55	 6.94	 1.18	 5.05	 3.56	 5.22	 6.57	 4.61	 9.50	
Assistance	rate	10-<20%	 0.072***	 0.078***	 -0.015	 0.076***	 0.088***	 0.045***	 0.095***	 0.071***	 0.065***	
	 10.06	 7.62	 -0.23	 7.49	 3.68	 5.96	 9.71	 8.30	 15.58	
Assistance	rate	20-<50%	 0.083***	 0.077***	 -0.011	 0.094***	 0.082**	 0.049***	 0.127***	 0.081***	 0.059***	
	 6.60	 4.41	 -0.14	 6.15	 2.42	 3.21	 6.44	 7.34	 8.39	
Assistance	rate	50+%	 -0.005	 0.006	 -0.167	 -0.006	 -0.060	 -0.020	 0.021	 -0.006	 -0.048***	
	 -0.21	 0.18	 -1.55	 -0.35	 -1.60	 -1.15	 0.66	 -0.25	 -3.28	
Observations	 12,110	 14,063	 1,227	 93,680	 55,242	 14,942	 23,605	 13,361	 18,110	
Number	of	firms	 6,014	 6,154	 389	 32,324	 18,939	 6,333	 8,909	 4,890	 7,370	
Rubins'	B	 20.9	 18.9	 20.1	 10.9	 12.6	 15.5	 14.5	 18.7	 15.7	
Rubins'	R	 1.08	 0.92	 1.06	 0.93	 0.96	 1.03	 1.02	 1.05	 1.12	
Source:	Table	U.1	(unpublished	appendix).	z-statistics	in	italics	and	parenthesis.	***/**/*	significant	at	1/5/10%	level.	
a	‘matched'	sample	comprising	treatment	and	control	group	obtained	using	propensity	score	matching	for	each	industry.	Rubin	(2001)	recommends	that	B	be	less	than	25	and	that	R	be	between	0.5	
and	2	for	the	samples	to	be	considered	sufficiently	balanced.		
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Table 5: (cont.) 
Dependent	variable:	ln	sales	
		
Printing	 Cultural	 Petroleum	
Processing	
Chemical	 Medical	 Rubber	 Plastic	 Nonmetal	
products	
Metal	
products	
(SIC23)				 (SIC24)			 (SIC25+70)	 (SIC26+28)			 (SIC27)		 (SIC29)		 (SIC30)		 	(SIC31)		 	(SIC32+33+34)	
Results	for	assistance	variables	based	on	‘full’	data	sample	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	
Assistance	rate	<10%	 0.069***	 0.055***	 0.016	 0.031***	 0.043***	 0.063***	 0.018***	 0.047***	 -0.016	
	 10.43	 7.68	 1.09	 9.65	 5.47	 5.10	 3.09	 3.43	 -1.31	
Assistance	rate	10-<20%	 0.109***	 0.110***	 0.088***	 0.075***	 0.101***	 0.103***	 0.054***	 0.086***	 0.083***	
	 14.02	 10.36	 3.73	 23.69	 12.34	 9.12	 4.01	 6.27	 3.30	
Assistance	rate	20-<50%	 0.114***	 0.131***	 0.069**	 0.073***	 0.116***	 0.113***	 0.055***	 0.104***	 0.082**	
	 7.14	 10.84	 2.05	 16.04	 8.59	 5.36	 4.65	 3.92	 2.34	
Assistance	rate	50+%	 -0.019	 -0.054**	 -0.032	 -0.006	 0.001	 0.021	 -0.028	 0.055*	 0.128***	
	 -0.84	 -1.96	 -0.72	 -0.61	 0.03	 0.64	 -1.32	 1.89	 2.75	
	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	
Observations	 36,663	 24,426	 8,544	 73,792	 23,574	 22,894	 54,610	 118,081	 91,234	
Number	of	firms	 10,168	 6,962	 3,061	 26,817	 7,328	 6,611	 18,174	 35,083	 32,525	
AR(2)	z-statistic	p-value	 0.681	 0.270	 0.177	 0.482	 0.690	 0.293	 0.143	 0.219	 0.133	
Hansen	test	p-value	 0.226	 0.159	 0.646	 0.111	 0.247	 0.233	 0.441	 0.102	 0.334	
	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	
Results	for	assistance	variables	based	on	'matched’	data	samplea	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	
Assistance	rate	<10%	 0.056***	 0.052***	 0.014	 0.026***	 0.042***	 0.048***	 0.013**	 0.044**	 -0.017	
	 10.16	 6.43	 0.86	 8.54	 5.56	 4.88	 2.25	 2.33	 -1.18	
Assistance	rate	10-<20%	 0.098***	 0.100***	 0.088***	 0.068***	 0.092***	 0.082***	 0.041***	 0.084***	 0.105**	
	 15.40	 9.57	 3.35	 21.28	 11.33	 7.18	 3.17	 3.99	 2.54	
Assistance	rate	20-<50%	 0.080***	 0.122***	 0.072**	 0.067***	 0.104***	 0.083***	 0.044***	 0.102***	 0.117**	
	 5.71	 10.06	 1.96	 15.20	 7.96	 4.38	 3.76	 2.58	 2.04	
Assistance	rate	50+%	 -0.047**	 -0.057*	 -0.038	 -0.023**	 -0.009	 -0.009	 -0.016	 0.041	 0.171**	
	 -2.40	 -1.93	 -0.74	 -2.22	 -0.37	 -0.30	 -0.95	 1.09	 2.25	
	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	
Observations	 18,443	 15,290	 6,657	 46,149	 15,390	 13,856	 44,588	 94,455	 73,534	
Number	of	firms	 6,795	 4,994	 2,728	 19,266	 5,646	 4,820	 16,427	 32,112	 29,099	
Rubins'	B	 12.4	 18.8	 16.5	 11.0	 12.4	 16.3	 12.2	 9.7	 10.9	
Rubins'	R	 0.88	 1.04	 0.99	 0.93	 0.93	 0.93	 0.97	 0.92	 0.95	
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Table 5: (cont.) 
Dependent	variable:	ln	sales	
		
Machinery	&	
Equipment	
Transport	equipment	 Measuring	
instrument	
Other	
manufacturing	
Electronic	power	 Gas	
production	
Water	
production	
Coal	Mining	
	(SIC35+36)	 (SIC37)		 	(SIC41)	 (SIC42+43)		 (SIC44)		 (SIC45)		 (SIC46)		 (SIC60)		
Results	for	assistance	variables	based	on	‘full’	data	sample	 	 	 	 	 	 	
Assistance	rate	<10%	 0.034***	 0.043***	 0.033	 0.063***	 0.102**	 0.118***	 0.083***	 0.026***	
	 6.38	 3.20	 1.44	 8.74	 2.36	 3.69	 5.43	 3.82	
Assistance	rate	10-<20%	 0.075***	 0.089***	 0.069**	 0.086***	 0.228***	 0.213***	 0.097***	 0.068***	
	 10.88	 4.17	 2.06	 12.30	 5.89	 7.24	 6.23	 8.56	
Assistance	rate	20-<50%	 0.081***	 0.084***	 0.043	 0.089***	 0.139***	 0.109***	 0.091***	 0.075***	
	 6.53	 3.17	 1.01	 8.44	 2.99	 2.70	 3.52	 6.84	
Assistance	rate	50+%	 -0.048***	 -0.022	 -0.067*	 -0.039*	 -0.093**	 -0.113	 -0.080**	 -0.166***	
	 -2.91	 -0.70	 -1.65	 -1.80	 -2.29	 -1.44	 -2.00	 -7.56	
	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	
Observations	 188,401	 46,313	 26,446	 40,629	 35,706	 2,238	 17,701	 39,145	
Number	of	firms	 60,649	 16,494	 10,157	 13,991	 7,724	 695	 3,041	 11,723	
AR(2)	z-statistic	p-value	 0.252	 0.130	 0.109	 0.134	 0.437	 0.178	 0.122	 0.118	
Hansen	test	p-value	 0.135	 0.220	 0.963	 0.114	 0.437	 0.140	 0.169	 0.152	
	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	
Results	for	assistance	variables	based	on	'matched’	data	samplea	 	 	 	 	 	 	
Assistance	rate	<10%	 0.037***	 0.033***	 0.046*	 0.059***	 0.130**	 0.132***	 0.104***	 0.026***	
	 7.04	 4.27	 1.87	 7.73	 2.41	 3.82	 3.19	 3.67	
Assistance	rate	10-<20%	 0.071***	 0.079***	 0.083**	 0.080***	 0.230***	 0.229***	 0.124**	 0.054***	
	 10.37	 5.42	 2.29	 11.37	 4.05	 7.56	 2.14	 6.40	
Assistance	rate	20-<50%	 0.075***	 0.081***	 0.062	 0.079***	 0.132**	 0.134***	 0.109	 0.071***	
	 5.74	 4.36	 1.33	 7.25	 2.13	 3.51	 1.54	 5.97	
Assistance	rate	50+%	 -0.045***	 -0.029	 -0.038	 -0.038*	 -0.126**	 -0.072	 -0.106	 -0.140***	
	 -2.75	 -1.24	 -1.04	 -1.75	 -2.40	 -1.08	 -1.34	 -5.86	
	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	
Observations	 147,579	 26,377	 22,225	 33,075	 24,057	 1,438	 10,203	 19,182	
Number	of	firms	 54,978	 11,149	 9,168	 12,460	 7,045	 506	 2,796	 7,654	
Rubins'	B	 8.0	 12.8	 15.7	 13.0	 7.8	 24.6	 9.3	 14.0	
Rubins'	R	 0.91	 0.97	 0.96	 0.97	 1.02	 1.12	 0.97	 0.92	
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Table U.1: Long-run two-step system-GMM production function (26 industries, China, 1998-2007) 
Dependent	variable:	ln	sales	
		
Other	Mining	 Food	
production	
Tobacco	 Textile	 Apparel	
&footwear	
Leather	
(SIC10+80)	 (SIC14)		 (SIC16)		 (SIC17)		 	(SIC18)		 (SIC19)			
ln	intermediate	inputs	 0.579***	 0.370***	 0.367***	 0.623***	 0.592***	 0.690***	
	 7.39	 2.56	 4.28	 10.15	 6.50	 12.12	
ln	employment	 0.271***	 0.446***	 0.743**	 0.315***	 0.246**	 0.181***	
	 4.70	 3.45	 2.51	 5.37	 2.80	 3.79	
ln	capital	 0.193**	 0.273*	 0.366**	 0.107***	 0.205**	 0.143*	
	 2.46	 1.68	 2.31	 4.49	 1.96	 1.93	
Time	trend	 0.034***	 0.028***	 0.046**	 0.001	 0.054***	 0.016***	
	 12.03	 3.11	 2.21	 0.20	 10.03	 4.66	
Assistance	rate	<10%	 0.027***	 0.064***	 0.022	 0.024***	 0.034***	 0.019***	
	 4.40	 7.48	 0.57	 5.57	 3.86	 4.60	
Assistance	rate	10-<20%	 0.069***	 0.091***	 0.013	 0.083***	 0.081***	 0.035***	
	 11.07	 7.93	 0.25	 7.73	 4.10	 4.39	
Assistance	rate	20-<50%	 0.080***	 0.087***	 0.067	 0.101***	 0.079***	 0.035***	
	 7.24	 4.67	 0.84	 6.19	 2.96	 2.57	
Assistance	rate	50+%	 -0.011	 0.028	 -0.109	 0.001	 -0.062*	 -0.013	
	 -0.45	 0.88	 -1.00	 0.06	 -1.84	 -0.81	
ln	firm	age	 0.009	 -0.013	 -0.045	 -0.055***	 -0.069***	 -0.026*	
	 1.08	 -1.41	 -0.60	 -3.56	 -3.00	 -1.75	
No	political	affiliation	 0.022***	 0.030**	 0.187**	 0.033***	 0.014**	 -0.008*	
	 3.01	 2.50	 1.99	 5.26	 1.94	 -1.86	
High	political	affiliation	 -0.070**	 0.061**	 -0.136	 -0.029*	 0.031	 -0.030	
	 -2.33	 2.34	 -0.80	 -1.79	 0.70	 -1.07	
Foreign-owned	 -0.040	 -0.057	 0.090	 -0.043***	 -0.059*	 -0.027**	
	 -0.83	 -0.72	 0.44	 -2.66	 -1.91	 -2.20	
SOE	 -0.098***	 -0.146***	 0.003	 -0.154***	 -0.116***	 -0.061***	
	 -2.66	 -3.51	 0.05	 -5.51	 -2.74	 -2.85	
HK/Macau/Taiwan-owned	 0.005	 -0.050	 0.424**	 -0.077***	 -0.065***	 -0.038**	
	 0.12	 -0.79	 1.98	 -3.97	 -2.56	 -2.51	
Collective-owned	 0.024*	 0.005	 0.088	 0.011**	 -0.001	 0.007	
	 1.85	 0.41	 0.90	 2.21	 -0.11	 1.19	
Exporter	 -0.009	 0.043	 0.254	 -0.003	 -0.000	 -0.000	
	 -0.06	 0.21	 1.58	 -0.23	 -0.00	 -0.06	
R&D	dummy	 0.016	 -0.459	 -0.329*	 0.029***	 -0.097	 0.114	
	 0.15	 -1.20	 -1.88	 3.50	 -1.38	 0.79	
ln	Agglomeration	 0.025	 0.046	 -0.025	 0.023	 0.030	 -0.004	
	 3.44	 3.73	 -0.64	 3.96	 2.49	 -1.49	
ln	Diversification	 0.062***	 0.072***	 0.008	 0.159***	 0.191***	 0.097***	
	 4.14	 3.54	 0.13	 11.19	 8.16	 4.31	
ln	Herfindahl	 -0.062***	 -0.213***	 0.083	 0.245***	 0.165***	 0.002	
	 -3.61	 -3.72	 0.92	 11.71	 4.60	 0.12	
ln	Fixed	costs	 -0.017***	 -0.048**	 -0.049*	 -0.026***	 -0.009	 -0.020***	
	 -4.72	 -2.37	 -1.87	 -3.15	 -0.67	 -2.73	
Neg_liquid	 -0.019***	 -0.052***	 -0.047	 -0.037***	 -0.060***	 -0.024**	
	 -2.95	 -4.12	 -0.89	 -5.72	 -3.53	 -2.44	
ln	liquidity	 0.327***	 0.355**	 1.161***	 0.307***	 0.335***	 0.139**	
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	 3.44	 2.24	 4.84	 6.35	 2.69	 2.23	
City	200	 -0.017**	 -0.021	 -0.114**	 -0.062***	 -0.063***	 -0.037***	
	 -2.30	 -1.39	 -2.27	 -5.59	 -3.75	 -6.50	
Western	China	 0.019	 -0.009	 0.270*	 0.043***	 -0.024	 -0.039***	
	 1.42	 -0.31	 1.80	 3.48	 -0.90	 -2.97	
East	Coast	 -0.058***	 -0.047	 0.156	 -0.034**	 -0.081*	 -0.017	
	 -4.03	 -1.23	 1.60	 -2.24	 -1.91	 -0.74	
Central	China	 -0.023	 0.018	 0.069	 0.012	 -0.081**	 -0.020	
	 -1.57	 0.70	 0.82	 1.01	 -1.98	 -1.27	
Proportion	new	firms	 -0.221**	 -0.265	 -0.480	 -0.477***	 -0.261***	 0.030	
	 -2.34	 -1.01	 -1.42	 -4.81	 -2.59	 0.65	
Tariff	rate	(fob	final	goods)	 -0.016***	 -0.008***	 0.000	 -0.002*	 0.002	 -0.004	
	 -4.92	 -2.59	 0.11	 -1.70	 0.38	 -1.17	
	 	 	 	 	 	 	
Observations	 22,089	 23,186	 2,244	 112,526	 65,023	 24,872	
Number	of	firms	 9,426	 8,850	 483	 35,007	 20,534	 9,209	
AR(2)	z-statistic	 0.344	 -1.423	 0.273	 -1.052	 0.099	 -1.219	
AR(2)	z-statistic	p-value	 0.731	 0.155	 0.785	 0.293	 0.921	 0.223	
Hansen	test	 10.070	 9.934	 9.911	 5.124	 7.840	 7.327	
Hansen	test	p-value	 0.122	 0.127	 0.538	 0.163	 0.250	 0.396	
Returns-To-Scale	 0.043	 0.089	 0.475**	 0.046***	 0.043*	 0.014	
		 1.14	 1.18	 2.47	 3.14	 1.65	 0.61	
	 	 	 	 	 	 	
Results	for	assistance	variables	based	on	'matched’	data	samplea	 	 	 	 	
Assistance	rate	<10%	 0.031***	 0.053***	 0.048	 0.019***	 0.040***	 0.023***	
	 4.55	 6.94	 1.18	 5.05	 3.56	 5.22	
Assistance	rate	10-<20%	 0.072***	 0.078***	 -0.015	 0.076***	 0.088***	 0.045***	
	 10.06	 7.62	 -0.23	 7.49	 3.68	 5.96	
Assistance	rate	20-<50%	 0.083***	 0.077***	 -0.011	 0.094***	 0.082**	 0.049***	
	 6.60	 4.41	 -0.14	 6.15	 2.42	 3.21	
Assistance	rate	50+%	 -0.005	 0.006	 -0.167	 -0.006	 -0.060	 -0.020	
	 -0.21	 0.18	 -1.55	 -0.35	 -1.60	 -1.15	
	 	 	 	 	 	 	
Observations	 12,110	 14,063	 1,227	 93,680	 55,242	 14,942	
Number	of	firms	 6,014	 6,154	 389	 32,324	 18,939	 6,333	
Rubins'	B	 20.9	 18.9	 20.1	 10.9	 12.6	 15.5	
Rubins'	R	 1.08	 0.92	 1.06	 0.93	 0.96	 1.03	
	 	 	 	 	 	 	
z-statistics in italics and parenthesis. ***/**/* significant at 1/5/10% level. 
a ‘matched' sample comprising treatment and control group obtained using propensity score matching for each industry. 
Rubin (2001) recommends that B be less than 25 and that R be between 0.5 and 2 for the samples to be considered 
sufficiently balanced.  
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Table U.1. Cont 
Dependent	variable:	ln	sales	
		
Timber	 Furniture	 Paper-making	 Printing	 Cultural	 Petroleum	
Processing	
	 (SIC20)			 	(SIC21)		 (SIC22)			 (SIC23)				 (SIC24)			 (SIC25+70)	
ln	intermediate	inputs	 0.404***	 0.789***	 0.607***	 0.554***	 0.764***	 0.564***	
	 3.21	 9.88	 12.65	 7.58	 14.86	 3.95	
ln	employment	 0.543***	 0.180**	 0.313***	 0.352**	 0.220***	 0.372***	
	 4.44	 2.18	 7.06	 2.54	 3.32	 2.64	
ln	capital	 0.170**	 0.106***	 0.098***	 0.186***	 0.063*	 0.146**	
	 1.99	 2.73	 3.06	 3.87	 1.89	 1.99	
Time	trend	 0.051***	 0.019***	 0.030***	 0.052***	 0.082***	 -0.018*	
	 5.64	 3.13	 10.45	 5.74	 15.06	 -1.68	
Assistance	rate	<10%	 0.057***	 0.042***	 0.035***	 0.069***	 0.055***	 0.016	
	 5.99	 5.53	 10.54	 10.43	 7.68	 1.09	
Assistance	rate	10-<20%	 0.094***	 0.080***	 0.066***	 0.109***	 0.110***	 0.088***	
	 8.75	 9.87	 16.23	 14.02	 10.36	 3.73	
Assistance	rate	20-<50%	 0.113***	 0.092***	 0.060***	 0.114***	 0.131***	 0.069**	
	 5.54	 8.59	 9.52	 7.14	 10.84	 2.05	
Assistance	rate	50+%	 -0.017	 0.002	 -0.043***	 -0.019	 -0.054**	 -0.032	
	 -0.47	 0.09	 -2.98	 -0.84	 -1.96	 -0.72	
ln	firm	age	 -0.028**	 -0.021*	 -0.016**	 -0.122***	 -0.005	 -0.059	
	 -2.29	 -1.77	 -2.51	 -3.29	 -0.38	 -1.56	
No	political	affiliation	 0.023	 0.005	 -0.006	 0.031***	 0.006	 0.041**	
	 1.54	 0.67	 -1.51	 3.83	 0.66	 2.15	
High	political	affiliation	 -0.207***	 0.005	 0.035**	 0.037**	 0.018	 0.024	
	 -2.37	 0.14	 2.13	 2.13	 0.48	 0.36	
Foreign-owned	 -0.065*	 0.021	 -0.072*	 -0.112***	 0.026	 0.099	
	 -1.80	 0.40	 -1.84	 -2.61	 0.83	 1.12	
SOE	 -0.320***	 -0.127**	 -0.027**	 -0.143***	 -0.113*	 -0.048	
	 -3.27	 -2.06	 -2.15	 -4.56	 -1.82	 -1.21	
HK/Macau/Taiwan-owned	 -0.134***	 -0.013	 -0.096**	 -0.163***	 -0.016	 0.024	
	 -3.70	 -0.22	 -2.17	 -3.73	 -0.44	 0.37	
Collective-owned	 0.070***	 0.007	 0.003	 0.046***	 -0.033*	 -0.002	
	 2.99	 0.53	 0.55	 4.25	 -1.75	 -0.09	
Exporter	 -0.119**	 0.230	 -0.291**	 -0.147	 0.334*	 -0.837**	
	 -2.01	 1.51	 -2.20	 -1.12	 1.92	 -2.33	
R&D	dummy	 0.443	 -0.013	 0.008	 0.064***	 0.024	 0.024	
	 1.16	 -0.86	 0.61	 3.49	 1.51	 0.67	
ln	Agglomeration	 0.078***	 0.030***	 0.021***	 0.033***	 -0.026**	 0.030	
	 4.23	 3.25	 3.16	 2.87	 -2.37	 1.59	
ln	Diversification	 0.272***	 0.133***	 0.116***	 0.199***	 0.146***	 0.104*	
	 5.85	 3.23	 8.82	 14.31	 4.45	 1.67	
ln	Herfindahl	 0.049*	 0.016	 -0.063***	 0.057***	 0.491***	 -0.190***	
	 1.73	 0.33	 -7.08	 3.04	 7.05	 -3.14	
ln	Fixed	costs	 -0.071***	 -0.020**	 -0.017***	 -0.034***	 -0.005	 -0.039**	
	 -4.86	 -2.22	 -4.89	 -5.00	 -0.81	 -2.38	
Neg_liquid	 -0.051***	 -0.027***	 -0.023***	 -0.057***	 -0.025***	 -0.056***	
	 -3.49	 -2.59	 -4.94	 -6.70	 -2.60	 -2.85	
ln	liquidity	 0.412***	 0.188***	 0.146***	 0.472***	 0.167***	 0.425**	
	 2.73	 2.68	 4.66	 5.61	 2.92	 2.24	
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City	200	 0.022	 -0.074***	 -0.038***	 -0.109***	 0.011	 -0.012	
	 0.86	 -6.30	 -6.42	 -7.20	 0.76	 -0.54	
Western	China	 0.001	 -0.025	 -0.040***	 0.034	 0.200***	 0.304***	
	 0.02	 -0.74	 -4.80	 1.44	 3.88	 2.97	
East	Coast	 -0.055**	 -0.025	 -0.053***	 0.062**	 0.034	 0.229***	
	 -2.02	 -0.53	 -4.03	 2.10	 0.77	 2.69	
Central	China	 0.022	 -0.022	 -0.020**	 0.046**	 -0.191***	 0.217***	
	 0.87	 -0.79	 -2.15	 2.50	 -2.60	 2.77	
Proportion	new	firms	 -0.286***	 -0.011	 -0.066	 0.386*	 0.412***	 0.148	
	 -3.93	 -0.12	 -0.34	 1.84	 2.86	 0.88	
Tariff	rate	(fob	final	goods)	 -0.013***	 -0.002*	 -0.003***	 -0.003	 -0.003	 0.007	
	 -4.19	 -1.69	 -3.26	 -1.56	 -1.56	 0.38	
	 	 	 	 	 	 	
Observations	 38,762	 22,091	 30,420	 36,663	 24,426	 8,544	
Number	of	firms	 12,942	 6,960	 10,230	 10,168	 6,962	 3,061	
AR(2)	z-statistic	 -1.511	 -1.063	 0.339	 -0.411	 -1.104	 -1.350	
AR(2)	z-statistic	p-value	 0.131	 0.288	 0.735	 0.681	 0.270	 0.177	
Hansen	test	 5.826	 11.850	 6.966	 11.780	 13.080	 3.348	
Hansen	test	p-value	 0.667	 0.158	 0.223	 0.226	 0.159	 0.646	
Returns-To-Scale	 0.116*	 0.075**	 0.017	 0.093	 0.046	 0.082	
		 1.78	 2.03	 0.58	 1.40	 1.44	 1.38	
	 	 	 	 	
Results	for	assistance	variables	based	on	'matched’	data	sample	 	 	 	 	
Assistance	rate	<10%	 0.060***	 0.037***	 0.035***	 0.056***	 0.052***	 0.014	
	 6.57	 4.61	 9.50	 10.16	 6.43	 0.86	
Assistance	rate	10-<20%	 0.095***	 0.071***	 0.065***	 0.098***	 0.100***	 0.088***	
	 9.71	 8.30	 15.58	 15.40	 9.57	 3.35	
Assistance	rate	20-<50%	 0.127***	 0.081***	 0.059***	 0.080***	 0.122***	 0.072**	
	 6.44	 7.34	 8.39	 5.71	 10.06	 1.96	
Assistance	rate	50+%	 0.021	 -0.006	 -0.048***	 -0.047**	 -0.057*	 -0.038	
	 0.66	 -0.25	 -3.28	 -2.40	 -1.93	 -0.74	
	 	 	 	 	 	 	
Observations	 23,605	 13,361	 18,110	 18,443	 15,290	 6,657	
Number	of	firms	 8,909	 4,890	 7,370	 6,795	 4,994	 2,728	
Rubins'	B	 14.5	 18.7	 15.7	 12.4	 18.8	 16.5	
Rubins'	R	 1.02	 1.05	 1.12	 0.88	 1.04	 0.99	
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Table U.1. Cont 
Dependent	variable:	ln	sales	
	
Chemical	 Medical	 Rubber	 Plastic	 Nonmetal	
products	
Metal	
products	
	 (SIC26+28)			 (SIC27)		 (SIC29)		 (SIC30)		 	(SIC31)		 	(SIC32+33+34)	
ln	intermediate	inputs	 0.516***	 0.468***	 0.591***	 0.838***	 0.257***	 0.433***	
	 22.06	 8.34	 5.32	 21.65	 3.24	 5.21	
ln	employment	 0.593***	 0.517***	 0.237*	 0.141***	 0.812***	 0.748***	
	 18.09	 3.72	 1.77	 2.58	 6.41	 3.24	
ln	capital	 0.071***	 0.166***	 0.131*	 0.061***	 0.234**	 0.249***	
	 3.83	 4.16	 1.81	 3.10	 2.23	 2.80	
Time	trend	 0.028***	 0.037***	 0.046***	 0.028***	 0.144***	 0.101***	
	 18.13	 5.59	 3.46	 5.21	 12.39	 6.43	
Assistance	rate	<10%	 0.031***	 0.043***	 0.063***	 0.018***	 0.047***	 -0.016	
	 9.65	 5.47	 5.10	 3.09	 3.43	 -1.31	
Assistance	rate	10-<20%	 0.075***	 0.101***	 0.103***	 0.054***	 0.086***	 0.083***	
	 23.69	 12.34	 9.12	 4.01	 6.27	 3.30	
Assistance	rate	20-<50%	 0.073***	 0.116***	 0.113***	 0.055***	 0.104***	 0.082**	
	 16.04	 8.59	 5.36	 4.65	 3.92	 2.34	
Assistance	rate	50+%	 -0.006	 0.001	 0.021	 -0.028	 0.055*	 0.128***	
	 -0.61	 0.03	 0.64	 -1.32	 1.89	 2.75	
ln	firm	age	 -0.043***	 -0.069**	 -0.042*	 -0.018	 -0.198***	 -0.220***	
	 -9.43	 -2.49	 -1.66	 -1.57	 -5.68	 -3.43	
No	political	affiliation	 0.030***	 0.043***	 0.020**	 -0.001	 0.036***	 0.033***	
	 7.17	 3.13	 1.97	 -0.32	 2.91	 3.13	
High	political	affiliation	 -0.015	 0.001	 0.032	 -0.004	 -0.017	 -0.363***	
	 -1.08	 0.07	 0.62	 -0.26	 -0.34	 -3.56	
Foreign-owned	 0.023	 0.008	 -0.024	 0.001	 0.051	 -0.209***	
	 1.41	 0.24	 -0.31	 0.04	 0.51	 -3.11	
SOE	 -0.089***	 -0.102***	 -0.176***	 -0.071***	 -0.292***	 -0.313***	
	 -9.55	 -4.99	 -2.87	 -2.99	 -8.27	 -5.17	
HK/Macau/Taiwan-owned	 0.002	 0.013	 -0.059	 -0.032**	 -0.099	 -0.349***	
	 0.15	 0.61	 -0.74	 -2.12	 -1.52	 -5.18	
Collective-owned	 -0.001	 0.008	 0.031**	 0.006	 -0.012	 0.027*	
	 -0.27	 0.75	 2.09	 1.00	 -0.67	 1.83	
Exporter	 -0.071*	 -0.088	 -0.056	 0.037**	 0.200	 0.066	
	 -1.66	 -0.76	 -0.36	 2.06	 1.34	 0.47	
R&D	dummy	 -0.014	 0.200*	 0.242	 0.159**	 -0.116*	 -0.013	
	 -0.19	 1.74	 1.39	 2.23	 -1.64	 -0.70	
ln	Agglomeration	 0.031***	 0.018	 0.043***	 -0.005	 0.097***	 0.039***	
	 8.69	 1.47	 3.14	 -1.26	 8.10	 3.49	
ln	Diversification	 0.114***	 0.131***	 0.201***	 0.148***	 0.194***	 0.348***	
	 12.50	 7.40	 5.84	 6.74	 4.91	 6.97	
ln	Herfindahl	 -0.059***	 -0.167***	 -0.257***	 -0.040	 -0.156***	 0.087***	
	 -10.17	 -4.23	 -4.03	 -1.15	 -4.06	 3.11	
ln	Fixed	costs	 -0.047***	 -0.083***	 -0.035***	 -0.016***	 -0.020*	 -0.113***	
	 -12.41	 -4.75	 -3.02	 -2.97	 -1.87	 -4.53	
Neg_liquid	 -0.040***	 -0.039***	 -0.044**	 -0.019***	 -0.094***	 -0.077***	
	 -9.85	 -4.31	 -2.48	 -3.54	 -7.62	 -4.85	
ln	liquidity	 0.208***	 0.433***	 0.287***	 0.249***	 0.382	 0.797***	
	 11.02	 6.81	 3.15	 7.66	 1.32	 5.39	
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City	200	 -0.043***	 -0.069***	 -0.114***	 -0.093***	 0.021	 -0.090***	
	 -7.73	 -5.67	 -6.70	 -4.75	 0.83	 -6.70	
Western	China	 0.028***	 0.060*	 -0.045*	 -0.024	 0.090***	 0.110***	
	 3.00	 1.82	 -1.82	 -1.51	 3.09	 2.89	
East	Coast	 -0.031***	 -0.054**	 -0.065*	 -0.023	 0.090**	 0.016	
	 -2.60	 -2.25	 -1.68	 -1.50	 2.34	 0.53	
Central	China	 -0.012	 0.009	 -0.066**	 -0.067***	 -0.154***	 0.056***	
	 -1.22	 0.45	 -2.02	 -5.19	 -5.46	 2.80	
Proportion	new	firms	 -0.635***	 -0.303*	 0.066	 -0.333***	 -1.884***	 -	
	 -7.41	 -1.68	 0.63	 -3.59	 -6.26	 	
Tariff	rate	(fob	final	goods)	 0.001*	 0.004	 -0.004	 0.005***	 0.066***	 -0.001	
	 1.69	 1.18	 -1.03	 3.57	 4.90	 -0.20	
	 	 	 	 	 	 	
Observations	 73,792	 23,574	 22,894	 54,610	 118,081	 91,234	
Number	of	firms	 26,817	 7,328	 6,611	 18,174	 35,083	 32,525	
AR(2)	z-statistic	 -0.703	 -0.399	 -1.051	 -1.464	 1.229	 1.502	
AR(2)	z-statistic	p-value	 0.482	 0.690	 0.293	 0.143	 0.219	 0.133	
Hansen	test	 13.020	 9.076	 12.840	 5.842	 7.721	 6.858	
Hansen	test	p-value	 0.111	 0.247	 0.233	 0.441	 0.102	 0.334	
Returns-To-Scale	 0.180***	 0.152	 -0.040	 0.039	 0.303***	 0.429***	
		 7.84	 1.41	 -0.74	 1.57	 5.23	 3.03	
	 	 	 	 	
Results	for	assistance	variables	based	on	'matched’	data	sample	 	 	 	 	
Assistance	rate	<10%	 0.026***	 0.042***	 0.048***	 0.013**	 0.044**	 -0.017	
	 8.54	 5.56	 4.88	 2.25	 2.33	 -1.18	
Assistance	rate	10-<20%	 0.068***	 0.092***	 0.082***	 0.041***	 0.084***	 0.105**	
	 21.28	 11.33	 7.18	 3.17	 3.99	 2.54	
Assistance	rate	20-<50%	 0.067***	 0.104***	 0.083***	 0.044***	 0.102***	 0.117**	
	 15.20	 7.96	 4.38	 3.76	 2.58	 2.04	
Assistance	rate	50+%	 -0.023**	 -0.009	 -0.009	 -0.016	 0.041	 0.171**	
	 -2.22	 -0.37	 -0.30	 -0.95	 1.09	 2.25	
	 	 	 	 	 	 	
Observations	 46,149	 15,390	 13,856	 44,588	 94,455	 73,534	
Number	of	firms	 19,266	 5,646	 4,820	 16,427	 32,112	 29,099	
Rubins'	B	 11.0	 12.4	 16.3	 12.2	 9.7	 10.9	
Rubins'	R	 0.93	 0.93	 0.93	 0.97	 0.92	 0.95	
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Table U.1. Cont 
Dependent	variable:	ln	sales	
	
Machinery	&	
Equipment	
Transport	
equipment	
Measuring	
instrument	
Other	
manufacturing	
Electronic	power	
	 	(SIC35+36)	 (SIC37)		 	(SIC41)	 (SIC42+43)		 (SIC44)		
ln	intermediate	inputs	 0.751***	 0.560***	 0.745***	 0.807***	 0.322***	
	 14.64	 4.22	 9.15	 19.95	 6.55	
ln	employment	 0.269***	 0.348**	 0.249**	 0.091*	 0.598***	
	 4.08	 2.07	 2.26	 1.79	 2.64	
ln	capital	 0.119***	 0.128**	 0.140*	 0.056**	 0.345**	
	 3.05	 2.45	 1.70	 1.98	 2.07	
Time	trend	 0.057***	 0.065***	 0.075***	 0.013***	 0.087***	
	 9.50	 4.12	 10.95	 3.10	 5.59	
Assistance	rate	<10%	 0.034***	 0.043***	 0.033	 0.063***	 0.102**	
	 6.38	 3.20	 1.44	 8.74	 2.36	
Assistance	rate	10-<20%	 0.075***	 0.089***	 0.069**	 0.086***	 0.228***	
	 10.88	 4.17	 2.06	 12.30	 5.89	
Assistance	rate	20-<50%	 0.081***	 0.084***	 0.043	 0.089***	 0.139***	
	 6.53	 3.17	 1.01	 8.44	 2.99	
Assistance	rate	50+%	 -0.048***	 -0.022	 -0.067*	 -0.039*	 -0.093**	
	 -2.91	 -0.70	 -1.65	 -1.80	 -2.29	
ln	firm	age	 -0.110***	 -0.034***	 -0.134***	 -0.044***	 0.011	
	 -8.19	 -2.63	 -2.88	 -2.72	 0.13	
No	political	affiliation	 0.025***	 0.006	 0.013	 -0.031***	 0.174***	
	 6.65	 0.75	 1.03	 -4.02	 3.34	
High	political	affiliation	 0.019	 -0.052	 0.016	 0.097***	 0.124	
	 1.03	 -0.71	 0.49	 3.19	 0.89	
Foreign-owned	 -0.015	 -0.010	 -0.026	 -0.056**	 0.027	
	 -0.54	 -0.23	 -0.44	 -1.97	 0.30	
SOE	 -0.177***	 -0.065**	 -0.118***	 -0.084*	 -0.093*	
	 -5.12	 -2.05	 -2.98	 -1.88	 -1.67	
HK/Macau/Taiwan-owned	 -0.096***	 -0.031	 -0.072**	 -0.108***	 0.077	
	 -4.85	 -0.89	 -2.15	 -3.79	 1.03	
Collective-owned	 0.020**	 0.007	 0.063**	 -0.005	 0.100	
	 2.20	 0.78	 2.18	 -0.44	 0.98	
Exporter	 -0.014	 -0.004	 0.165***	 -0.276	 -2.132***	
	 -0.34	 -0.05	 4.18	 -1.60	 -2.99	
R&D	dummy	 -0.141**	 0.004	 0.241	 -0.054	 0.086	
	 -2.39	 0.03	 1.17	 -1.22	 1.31	
ln	Agglomeration	 0.017***	 -0.178	 -0.003	 -0.038***	 0.067**	
	 4.27	 -0.86	 -0.49	 -3.12	 2.52	
ln	Diversification	 0.266***	 0.276*	 0.206***	 0.254***	 0.109***	
	 22.70	 1.64	 5.51	 9.96	 3.80	
ln	Herfindahl	 -0.071***	 -0.049	 0.085***	 0.055***	 -0.300***	
	 -4.46	 -1.54	 3.73	 3.73	 -3.60	
ln	Fixed	costs	 -0.051***	 -0.029***	 -0.016	 -0.014**	 -0.013	
	 -8.32	 -2.71	 -0.56	 -2.13	 -0.76	
Neg_liquid	 -0.047***	 -0.028***	 -0.053***	 -0.050***	 -0.030	
	 -7.31	 -4.26	 -3.20	 -5.26	 -0.75	
ln	liquidity	 0.360***	 0.185***	 0.526***	 0.177***	 1.024**	
	 6.36	 4.48	 3.25	 3.49	 2.07	
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City	200	 -0.182***	 -0.075***	 -0.092***	 -0.099***	 0.002	
	 -14.96	 -5.03	 -4.30	 -9.86	 0.05	
Western	China	 -0.026*	 0.099	 0.108***	 -0.004	 0.352***	
	 -1.89	 0.72	 2.67	 -0.15	 2.86	
East	Coast	 0.004	 0.031	 0.057	 0.006	 0.233***	
	 0.31	 0.40	 1.49	 0.26	 6.14	
Central	China	 -0.002	 -0.066	 0.006	 -0.102***	 0.224***	
	 -0.21	 -1.59	 0.17	 -4.13	 2.99	
Proportion	new	firms	 0.034	 -0.633**	 -0.707***	 -	 -0.594	
	 0.17	 -2.28	 -2.86	 	 -1.56	
Tariff	rate	(fob	final	goods)	 -0.006***	 0.000	 0.014***	 -0.002	 0.108***	
	 -3.69	 -0.18	 4.96	 -0.82	 7.93	
	 	 	 	 	 	
Observations	 188,401	 46,313	 26,446	 40,629	 35,706	
Number	of	firms	 60,649	 16,494	 10,157	 13,991	 7,724	
AR(2)	z-statistic	 -1.146	 -1.512	 -1.605	 -1.497	 -0.778	
AR(2)	z-statistic	p-value	 0.252	 0.130	 0.109	 0.134	 0.437	
Hansen	test	 16.180	 11.890	 1.935	 11.600	 3.780	
Hansen	test	p-value	 0.135	 0.220	 0.963	 0.114	 0.437	
Returns-To-Scale	 0.140***	 0.035	 0.134***	 -0.045	 0.266*	
		 6.21	 0.85	 2.88	 -1.23	 1.82	
	 	 	 	
Results	for	assistance	variables	based	on	'matched’	data	sample	 	 	 	
Assistance	rate	<10%	 0.037***	 0.033***	 0.046*	 0.059***	 0.130**	
	 7.04	 4.27	 1.87	 7.73	 2.41	
Assistance	rate	10-<20%	 0.071***	 0.079***	 0.083**	 0.080***	 0.230***	
	 10.37	 5.42	 2.29	 11.37	 4.05	
Assistance	rate	20-<50%	 0.075***	 0.081***	 0.062	 0.079***	 0.132**	
	 5.74	 4.36	 1.33	 7.25	 2.13	
Assistance	rate	50+%	 -0.045***	 -0.029	 -0.038	 -0.038*	 -0.126**	
	 -2.75	 -1.24	 -1.04	 -1.75	 -2.40	
	 	 	 	 	 	
Observations	 147,579	 26,377	 22,225	 33,075	 24,057	
Number	of	firms	 54,978	 11,149	 9,168	 12,460	 7,045	
Rubins'	B	 8.0	 12.8	 15.7	 13.0	 7.8	
Rubins'	R	 0.91	 0.97	 0.96	 0.97	 1.02	
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Table U.1. Cont 
Dependent	variable:	ln	sales	 Gas	production	 Water	production	 Coal	Mining	
	 (SIC45)		 (SIC46)		 (SIC60)		
ln	intermediate	inputs	 0.257***	 0.262***	 0.688***	
	 2.82	 5.28	 16.05	
ln	employment	 0.287***	 0.363*	 0.229***	
	 2.71	 1.86	 4.77	
ln	capital	 0.485***	 0.337***	 0.099***	
	 3.95	 3.85	 2.75	
Time	trend	 0.075***	 0.039***	 0.007	
	 6.47	 5.70	 1.30	
Assistance	rate	<10%	 0.118***	 0.083***	 0.026***	
	 3.69	 5.43	 3.82	
Assistance	rate	10-<20%	 0.213***	 0.097***	 0.068***	
	 7.24	 6.23	 8.56	
Assistance	rate	20-<50%	 0.109***	 0.091***	 0.075***	
	 2.70	 3.52	 6.84	
Assistance	rate	50+%	 -0.113	 -0.080**	 -0.166***	
	 -1.44	 -2.00	 -7.56	
ln	firm	age	 -0.026	 0.007	 -0.053***	
	 -0.46	 0.11	 -3.63	
No	political	affiliation	 0.169***	 0.120***	 0.034***	
	 2.60	 2.93	 3.62	
High	political	affiliation	 0.340***	 0.170***	 -0.053	
	 2.88	 2.62	 -0.82	
Foreign-owned	 -0.099	 0.205**	 -0.325**	
	 -1.28	 2.06	 -2.21	
SOE	 -0.286***	 -0.200***	 -0.137***	
	 -3.71	 -5.18	 -5.59	
HK/Macau/Taiwan-owned	 -0.122	 0.108	 0.057	
	 -1.57	 1.11	 0.63	
Collective-owned	 0.151*	 0.192***	 -0.024***	
	 1.85	 3.30	 -2.70	
Exporter	 -0.234	 0.616	 -0.063**	
	 -0.51	 1.30	 -2.28	
R&D	dummy	 -0.060	 0.133	 0.301***	
	 -0.73	 0.74	 4.33	
ln	Agglomeration	 0.121***	 0.103***	 0.061***	
	 3.11	 5.06	 8.64	
ln	Diversification	 0.144**	 0.120***	 0.045***	
	 2.26	 4.14	 3.08	
ln	Herfindahl	 0.213**	 0.060***	 -0.509***	
	 2.43	 3.59	 -14.58	
ln	Fixed	costs	 -0.097***	 -0.012	 0.003	
	 -4.21	 -1.07	 0.87	
Neg_liquid	 -0.028	 -0.042**	 -0.035***	
	 -0.81	 -2.52	 -5.32	
ln	liquidity	 0.859***	 0.416***	 0.363***	
	 3.11	 2.97	 5.31	
City	200	 -0.004	 0.050*	 -0.082***	
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	 -0.07	 1.81	 -8.44	
Western	China	 0.008	 0.128*	 0.142***	
	 0.09	 1.78	 6.26	
East	Coast	 -0.273***	 -0.100**	 -0.026	
	 -2.60	 -2.27	 -1.12	
Central	China	 0.092	 0.151*	 0.092***	
	 1.01	 1.70	 8.23	
Proportion	new	firms	 -0.114	 -0.211	 -0.164**	
	 -0.62	 -0.52	 -1.99	
Tariff	rate	(fob	final	goods)	 -	 -	 0.081***	
	 	 	 8.29	
	 	 	 	
Observations	 2,238	 17,701	 39,145	
Number	of	firms	 695	 3,041	 11,723	
AR(2)	z-statistic	 -1.346	 1.546	 -1.561	
AR(2)	z-statistic	p-value	 0.178	 0.122	 0.118	
Hansen	test	 26.840	 12.860	 8.073	
Hansen	test	p-value	 0.140	 0.169	 0.152	
Returns-To-Scale	 0.030	 -0.038	 0.016	
		 0.24	 -0.30	 0.47	
	 	 	
Results	for	assistance	variables	based	on	'matched’	data	sample	 	 	
Assistance	rate	<10%	 0.132***	 0.104***	 0.026***	
	 3.82	 3.19	 3.67	
Assistance	rate	10-<20%	 0.229***	 0.124**	 0.054***	
	 7.56	 2.14	 6.40	
Assistance	rate	20-<50%	 0.134***	 0.109	 0.071***	
	 3.51	 1.54	 5.97	
Assistance	rate	50+%	 -0.072	 -0.106	 -0.140***	
	 -1.08	 -1.34	 -5.86	
	 	 	 	
Observations	 1,438	 10,203	 19,182	
Number	of	firms	 506	 2,796	 7,654	
Rubins'	B	 24.6	 9.3	 14.0	
Rubins'	R	 1.12	 0.97	 0.92	
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Table	U.2:	Average	final	goods	tariffs	by	industry	in	China,	1998-2007	
industry	 ISIC	rev	3	 NBS	code	 1998	 1999	 2000	 2001	 2002	 2003	 2004	 2005	 2006	 2007	
Coal	mining	 10	 60	 4.21	 4.21	 4.21	 4.07	 4.07	 4.07	 4.07	 4.07	 3.64	 4.07	
Petroleum	&	Natural	Gas	extraction	 11	 70	 4.91	 6.00	 6.00	 6.00	 3.00	 3.00	 1.50	 1.50	 1.50	 1.50	
Ferrous	mining	 131	 80	 0.00	 0.00	 0.00	 0.00	 0.00	 0.00	 0.00	 0.00	 0.00	 0.00	
non-ferrous	mining	 132	 90	 0.11	 0.11	 0.11	 0.08	 0.08	 0.08	 0.08	 0.08	 0.08	 0.08	
Other	mining	 14	 10	 4.02	 3.97	 3.97	 3.40	 3.31	 3.30	 3.29	 3.28	 3.02	 3.32	
Timber	logging	 2	 12	 11.55	 10.97	 11.44	 10.51	 9.85	 9.33	 9.05	 9.25	 9.05	 8.49	
Processing	agricultural	products	 151-153	 13	 29.26	 28.99	 29.25	 27.84	 20.66	 18.77	 17.36	 15.53	 16.17	 16.13	
Foodstuff	 154	 14	 26.82	 26.82	 30.69	 29.40	 24.10	 21.95	 20.33	 18.54	 19.58	 19.69	
Beverages	 155	 15	 55.64	 55.80	 55.80	 50.80	 37.26	 30.46	 25.52	 21.93	 21.83	 21.73	
Tobacco	 16	 16	 65.00	 65.00	 65.00	 57.00	 48.00	 43.67	 41.00	 41.00	 38.17	 41.00	
Textiles	 17	 17	 24.8	 23.4	 22.05	 20.46	 16.61	 14.06	 11.75	 10.01	 10.23	 10.23	
Spinning,	weaving	and	textile	finishing	 171	 1711-1719	 23.26	 22.23	 21.30	 19.88	 15.53	 13.05	 10.91	 9.02	 9.39	 9.38	
Other	textiles	 172	 1721-1729	 27.38	 25.32	 23.20	 21.39	 18.19	 15.60	 13.11	 11.77	 11.74	 11.71	
knitted	fabrics	 173	 1730-1790	 29.64	 27.28	 24.83	 22.46	 18.96	 16.11	 13.31	 11.4	 11.4	 11.47	
Textile	wearing	apparel,	footwear	 18	+	192	 18	 31.83	 29.46	 26.75	 23.95	 21.69	 19.74	 17.84	 16.69	 16.7	 16.57	
Wearing	apparel	 181	 1810	 33.04	 30.28	 27.13	 24.08	 21.81	 19.68	 17.61	 16.29	 16.31	 16.23	
Fur	 182	 1820-1890	 22.50	 22.50	 22.50	 20.39	 19.04	 18.36	 17.69	 17.31	 17.31	 17.29	
Leather	 191	 1910-1919	 18.71	 18.18	 17.66	 16.29	 13.30	 12.82	 12.26	 12.07	 12.06	 12.14	
Footwear	 192	 1921-1952	 25.00	 25.00	 25.00	 24.00	 21.52	 20.59	 19.66	 19.66	 19.66	 19.15	
Wood	sawmilling	&	planing	 201	 2011-2012	 4.88	 2.44	 4.88	 4.81	 1.61	 1.36	 1.22	 1.22	 1.22	 1.02	
Wood	products	 202	 2021-2040	 14.30	 13.71	 14.30	 13.47	 9.17	 7.82	 6.49	 6.24	 6.23	 6.35	
Furniture	 361	 21	 22.00	 22.00	 22.00	 20.52	 12.59	 9.41	 6.36	 3.31	 3.25	 2.93	
Paper	 21	 22	 15.99	 15.84	 15.95	 14.82	 9.79	 8.05	 6.69	 5.80	 5.75	 5.62	
Publishing,	printing	 22	 23	 10.82	 10.82	 10.82	 9.71	 6.64	 5.52	 4.84	 4.15	 4.15	 3.87	
Cultural	 	 24	 0	 0	 0	 0	 0	 0	 0	 0	 0	 0	
Petroleum	processing	 23	 25	 6.78	 6.78	 6.78	 6.29	 5.78	 5.81	 5.81	 5.82	 5.63	 5.81	
Raw	chemicals	 241+242	ex.	2423	 26	 16.51	 11.19	 11.18	 10.23	 13.01	 8.07	 7.79	 6.87	 7.28	 7.35	
Medicines	 2423	 27	 9.46	 9.46	 9.46	 8.75	 5.2	 4.87	 4.85	 4.83	 4.81	 4.88	
Man-made	fibres	 243	 28	 17.71	 16.56	 16.10	 15.21	 10.06	 7.69	 5.33	 5.11	 5.11	 5.10	
Rubber	 251	 29	 15.07	 14.90	 14.79	 14.49	 13.32	 12.93	 12.64	 12.47	 11.04	 12.51	
Plastics	 252	 30	 17.37	 17.34	 17.35	 16.29	 11.67	 10.42	 9.19	 9.10	 9.00	 8.97	
Non-metallic	mineral	products	 26	 31	 17.27	 17.25	 17.19	 16.72	 14.05	 13.50	 12.96	 12.70	 12.33	 12.62	
Structural	metal	products	 281	 32	 15.06	 15.06	 15.06	 14.31	 11.26	 10.44	 9.86	 9.86	 9.86	 9.86	
Other	fabricated	metal	products	 289	 33	 13.53	 13.49	 13.48	 12.68	 11.42	 11.27	 11.20	 11.18	 11.15	 11.12	
Metal	products	 27	 34	 8.31	 8.31	 8.31	 7.38	 5.51	 5.28	 5.16	 5.16	 5.06	 5.13	
Ordinary	machinery	 291	 35	 14.92	 14.78	 14.78	 14.40	 10.02	 9.03	 8.29	 8.23	 8.11	 8.21	
Special	machinery	 292	 36	 13.43	 13.33	 13.28	 13.02	 9.52	 8.90	 8.64	 8.62	 8.53	 8.54	
Transport	equipment	 34	+	35	 37	 22.26	 22.24	 22.22	 20.14	 15.01	 13.45	 12.32	 11.42	 10.78	 10.75	
Electrical	machinery	and	equipment	 31	 39	 15.07	 15.07	 15.04	 14.53	 10.42	 9.60	 9.25	 9.20	 8.94	 9.27	
Communication	equipment	 32	 40	 18	 17.98	 17.99	 17	 11.08	 10.31	 9.71	 9.29	 9.27	 13.54	
Office	+measuring	equipment	 30+33	 41	 14.95	 14.79	 14.78	 13.66	 9.79	 8.97	 8.62	 8.48	 8.32	 8.46	
Manufacturing	nec	 369	 42+43	 21.97	 21.00	 21.84	 20.70	 17.70	 16.87	 16.18	 15.58	 15.22	 16.85	
Electric	power	&	heat	 401	 44	 5.50	 5.50	 5.50	 3.50	 2.75	 2.75	 2.75	 2.75	 2.75	 2.75	
Gas	production	 402	 45	 5.00	 5.00	 5.00	 5.00	 5.00	 5.00	 5.00	 5.00	 5.00	 5.00	
Water	production	 41	 46	 0	 0	 0	 0	 0	 0	 0	 0	 0	 0	
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Table U.3 Value of assistance to industry as a percentage of total value-added produced, China 1998-2007  
 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 
All firmsa           
Value-added not taxed at 17% rate 6.1 6.9 5.9 6.7 6.5 6.5 7.4 7.3 7.5 7.5 
Profits not taxed at 33% 2.2 1.1 4.4 3.8 3.8 4.2 4.4 4.3 4.5 4.8 
Subsidised income 1.5 0.9 1.3 1.1 1.2 0.9 1.1 1.1 1.0 0.7 
Total assistance 9.8 8.8 11.6 11.6 11.5 11.6 12.9 12.7 12.9 13.0 
Foreign-ownedb          
Value-added not taxed at 17% rate 8.2 7.1 7.7 7.8 9.7 9.9 10.8 11.0 11.0 10.8 
Profits not taxed at 33% 4.6 2.3 7.2 7.0 6.5 6.7 6.6 5.7 5.7 6.3 
Subsidised income 0.7 0.3 0.4 0.3 0.3 0.3 0.5 0.5 0.4 0.4 
Total assistance 13.4 9.8 15.3 15.1 16.6 16.9 17.8 17.1 17.1 17.4 
SOE's           
Value-added not taxed at 17% rate 4.7 6.9 4.1 5.8 4.4 4.1 4.3 4.3 5.3 5.3 
Profits not taxed at 33% 1.4 0.6 4.4 3.6 2.2 2.7 2.9 3.4 3.9 4.3 
Subsidised income 2.6 1.1 1.8 1.3 1.7 1.2 1.5 1.4 1.2 0.8 
Total assistance 8.6 8.6 10.4 10.7 8.2 8.0 8.7 9.2 10.4 10.4 
HK/Macao/Taiwan-owned         
Value-added not taxed at 17% rate 10.4 6.8 9.9 10.0 10.6 10.4 11.4 10.9 9.9 10.1 
Profits not taxed at 33% 3.3 2.5 5.4 5.8 5.6 5.7 6.0 5.5 5.3 5.5 
Subsidised income 0.4 0.3 0.3 0.3 0.4 0.2 0.4 0.5 0.5 0.5 
Total assistance 14.0 9.5 15.6 16.1 16.6 16.3 17.8 16.8 15.6 16.1 
Owned by collectives          
Value-added not taxed at 17% rate 7.7 6.7 7.7 7.5 7.8 7.8 7.4 7.8 7.1 7.4 
Profits not taxed at 33% 2.1 1.0 2.9 2.9 3.0 3.2 4.5 3.3 3.8 4.0 
Subsidised income 0.7 0.6 0.9 1.2 1.3 1.0 1.6 1.7 1.8 1.1 
Total assistance 10.4 8.3 11.5 11.6 12.1 12.1 13.5 12.8 12.7 12.5 
Owned by private companies         
Value-added not taxed at 17% rate 5.7 6.8 6.1 6.6 6.2 6.3 7.3 7.0 7.1 7.1 
Profits not taxed at 33% 2.5 1.5 3.8 3.0 4.2 4.4 4.4 4.3 4.4 4.6 
Subsidised income 0.9 0.8 1.3 1.3 1.2 0.9 1.0 1.2 1.0 0.8 
Total assistance 9.0 9.1 11.2 10.8 11.6 11.6 12.8 12.4 12.5 12.6 
a Covers manufacturing, mining and utilities.                                                   Source: NBS data 
b Each firm was assigned to the ownership sub-group which had 50+% of its share capital. When no sub-group had 50+% then the sub-group with the largest percentage share was used.  
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Figure U.1: Percentage of firms making no interest payments and implied interest rate for those making interest 
payments, China 1998-2007 
 
Source: NBS 
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